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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMIRALTY

SEAWORTHINESS A COAST GUARD SEAMAN MAY
SUE CIVILIAN SHIPOWNER UNDER THE UNSEAWORTHINESS DOCTRINE
FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED INCIDENT TO DUTY.

Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse (E.D. Pa. 1967)
In August 1965, plaintiff, a Coast Guard seaman apprentice, under
orders from his superior officer, went to the aid of the defendant whose
yacht had run aground.' Defendant accepted an offer to tow the yacht free
and passed a line which had been thrown to him through a bow deck cleat
and looped it around the forward stanchion. Soon after the towing operation commenced the stanchion broke loose and, due to the tautness of the
tow line, catapulted into the cockpit of the Coast Guard vessel striking the
plaintiff in the eye. Plaintiff brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging both negligence
and unseaworthiness, and at the trial both parties moved for summary
judgment.2 The court denied these motions holding, inter alia, that plaintiff is not precluded from bringing a suit for unseaworthiness because
he is a member of the Coast Guard. Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 277
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
The doctrine of unseaworthiness imposes strict liability upon shipowners for injuries sustained by "seamen." '3 Historically this cause of
action arose from the absolute duty shipowners owed to their crews to
provide a vessel that was reasonably adequate for its intended use with
4
regard to its construction, equipment, provisions, officers, and crew.
1. Before the Coast Guard's arrival, defendant received aid from an unidentified
boat, and the parties speculate that this boat notified the Coast Guard.
2. Defendant made three motions: (1) for summary judgment as to the claim
of unseaworthiness, (2) to strike the claim of unseaworthiness, and (3) to join the
United States as a third party defendant. All three motions were denied.
Although the defendant's motion to join the United States as a third party
defendant was denied on the ground that the United States was not liable as an
indemnitor to the defendant, had the tow line supplied by the Coast Guard broken
rather than the forward stanchion of the defendant's yacht, the United States could
have been held liable for indemnification for breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike service. See Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964) ; Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252 (1958);
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
3. E.g., Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959). "Seamen" has
traditionally meant "men who go to sea." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THS LAW O
ADMIRALTY § 6-53, at 358 (1957).
4. 1 P. EDELMAN, MARITIME INJURY AND DEATH 145 (1960). In Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), the Supreme Court held that a temporarily
unsafe condition breached the warranty of seaworthiness. The court stated:
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish an
accident-free ship. . . . The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness;

(637)
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During the past twenty-five years the United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of the doctrine to provide protection to injured parties
previously excluded from its benefits. 5 In commenting upon this expansion
of the doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently stated that: "It is now elementary that all who do traditional
seaman's work are owed, and may sue on, the warranty of seaworthiness.",,
In Nikiforow the defendant based his motion for summary judgment
on two objections: (1) that the warranty of seaworthiness does not extend
to persons other than members of defendant's crew, and (2) that plaintiff's
status as a member of the Coast Guard prevents him from suing a civilian
tortfeasor for injuries sustained in the line of duty.7
Defendant's first objection was dismissed by the court through application of the landmark decision of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,8 where

a land-based stevedore recovered on an allegation of unseaworthiness. In
reaching this conclusion, one which subsequently has been liberally construed by the courts,9 the Supreme Court reasoned:
It [the doctrine of unseaworthiness] is essentially a species of liability
without fault, analogous to other well known instances in our law.
Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards which performing the
service imposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions of
negligence nor contractual in character. .

.

. It is a form of absolute

duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy. 10

The Court further noted that this maritime remedy is not confined to
seamen, but extends to all who render service to a ship with the consent
of or by arrangement with her owner. Hence, anyone incurring the
hazards of maritime service, as measured by the norm of work historically
performed by crew members, can sue the owner of the ship that is benefited
by such service for injuries caused by her unseaworthiness. A shipowner
not a ship that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable
peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service.
Id. at 550. See Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 913 (1964) (negligent use of seaworthy equipment equated with unseaworthiness).
5. For a list of workers protected by the unseaworthiness doctrine see P.
EDHLMAN, supra note 4, at 176-78. See also Note, Risk Distributionand Seaworthiness,
75 YALE L.J. 1174, 1175, 1183 (1966).
6. Biggs v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 360 F.2d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 1966); accord,
Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963). The remedy provided by the doctrine of
unseaworthiness is not exclusive. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 3, § 6-23, at
288. Moreover, contributory negligence does not bar recovery, and assumption of
risk is not a defense under maritime law. Id. § 6-55, at 362. "[T]he seaman, in the
performance of his duties, is not deemed to assume the risk of unseaworthy appliances."
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944).
7. 277 F. Supp. 608, 610, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
8. 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ; accord, Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963). "[Tlhe
shipowner's obligation is rooted, not in contracts, but in the hazards of the work."
Id. at 415.
9. E.g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963). Previous to the Sieracki decision the unseaworthiness
doctrine only extended to workers traditionally known as seamen. Compare The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) with Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
10. 328 U.S. at 94-95.
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who is not the employer of the injured party is liable under the unseaworthiness doctrine, and, therefore, stevedores loading vessels under a
contract between their employer and a shipowner may assert the cause of
action. Under this doctrine the maritime industry, rather than the seaman,
must bear the burden of losses resulting from injuries sustained by seamen; it is a part of the operating costs for the industry. 1
The determinative question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff, at the
time he was injured, was rendering to the defendant's yacht a service
12
which traditionally had been rendered by crew members to their own ship.
As a Coast Guard seaman apprentice the plaintiff is subject to naval discipline and exposed to dangers traditionally feared by seamen. 13 As noted
earlier, seamen injured under similar circumstances may recover under
the unseaworthiness doctrine even though they are neither employed by
the defendant nor on the defendant's ship. 14 Since crew members are
duty-bound to save their ship if it is in peril, 5 the plaintiff, in aiding defendant's yacht, was performing a service which traditionally had been
performed by a ship's crew. 16 Therefore, if the plaintiff were not in the
Coast Guard, the defendant could undoubtedly be held accountable under
the unseaworthiness doctrine.
Membership in the Coast Guard imposed upon the plaintiff the duty
to assist persons and vessels in distress in navigable waters. 17 Although
Congress has established this statutory function of the Coast Guard, such
legislation does not create a "governmental duty of affirmative action owed
11. In the instant case this position is not as easily justified as in the usual case
where the respondent is a shipping company. Owners of pleasure crafts cannot distribute the costs of litigation to the public as can a shipping company. The fact that
plaintiff is entitled to gratuitous medical aid as well as other compensation mitigates
the argument that without recovery against the shipowner the injured seaman will be
deprived of necessary care and means of support while he is incapacitated. However,
in Nikiforow the court argued that the costs of such liability should nonetheless be
imposed upon a defendant as part of his operating costs, if only necessitating the
purchase of marine insurance. 277 F. Supp. 608, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1967). As to the
significance of the unseaworthiness doctrine in relation to insurance coverage, in the
United States a shipowner warrants to his insurer that he has no knowledge that his
ship is unseaworthy upon setting sail. Breach of this warranty relieves an insurer of
liability. L. BUGLASS, MARINE INSURANCE CLAIMS 22-23 (1963).
12. West v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 256 F.2d
671 (3d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 118 (1959). Passengers are not within the scope
of the unseaworthiness doctrine since they render no maritime service. Furthermore, if
a ship is deactivated or decommissioned no warranty of seaworthiness is given by her
owner. United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
13. Cf. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 105 (1946) (dissenting
opinion).
14. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963)
(longshoreman
recovered under unseaworthiness doctrine for injuries sustained when he slipped on
loose beans spilled on the dock) ; Flanagan v. The H.F. Gilligan, 170 F. Supp. 217
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (barge captain on barge under tow of respondent's tug recovered
against tug owner since as a lookout he was performing "crew work" for the tug
owner); Caudill v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1957) (army
stevedore recovered for injuries sustained in fall from defective Jacob's ladder);
Capadona v. The Lake Atlin, 101 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (seaman recovered
for injuries sustained in fall from defective ladder).
15. Bertel v. Panama Transp. Co., 202 F.2d 247, 248-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 834 (1953).
16. See note 3 supra.
17. bySee
14 U.S.C.
§§ 2, Charles
88 (1964).
Published
Villanova
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to a person or vessel in distress." 18 The Coast Guard is neither immune
from suit nor is its liability greater than that of a private salvor. 19 As in
the case of a private salvor, Coast Guard liability exists only when the
injured party relies to his detriment upon representations of voluntary
aid on the part of the rescuer or when his plight is worsened by Coast
Guard action.20 The Coast Guard's activities are not placed in a unique
category under maritime law; rather, under the modern division of
labor within the maritime industry, it provides services which previously
had been rendered by private mariners. 2 1
Defendant, citing McDaniel v. The Lisholt,22 asserted, however, that
plaintiff's membership in the Coast Guard precluded him from claiming
unseaworthiness. In McDaniel, recovery based on a claim of unseaworthiness was denied to a member of the Panama Canal Zone Fire Department
who, while standing firewatch, was injured by an explosion on board
a
ship which had been on fire several hours earlier. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the fireman's knowledge that
the ship was unsafe abrogated any duty to furnish him a seaworthy vessel
and that plaintiff was not rendering a maritime service since his primary
purpose for standing fire watch was to protect the Canal Zone from fires,
an activity only incidentally beneficial to the ship.
In this context it should be noted that maritime law does not distinguish between licensees and invitees, but dictates that "a shipowner
owes the duty of exercising reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard
the vessel who are not members of the crew."' 23 Thus the status of a noncrew member on board ship neither increases nor decreases a shipowner's
responsibility under maritime law. It can therefore be argued that if at
the time McDaniel was injured he had been rendering a maritime service
to a ship believed to be seaworthy, he would have recovered under the
doctrine of unseaworthiness.
Not only is the status of a complaining party immaterial under maritime law, but analogically important to the instant case is the fact that
servicemen have recovered for maritime torts. In Caudill v. Victory
24
Carriers
a soldier recovered in admiralty under the unseaworthiness
doctrine for injuries sustained in a fall from a defective Jacob's ladder.
Plaintiff worked as an Army stevedore assigned to duty aboard a floating
crane which was unloading the respondent's ship. The incident occurred
18. Frank v. United States, 250 F.2d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 962 (1958).
19. A salvor is a person who, without any particular relation to a ship in distress,
voluntarily renders useful services to her in order to preserve the
ship. M. NORRIS,
THI LAW OF SALVAGE § 4 (1958).
20. Frank v. United States, 250 F.2d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 1957).
21. Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 277 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Pa.
;see Petition
of the United States, 255 F. Supp. 737, 748-50 (D. Mass. 1966), 1967)
modified sub nom.,
United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d 189, 195
(1st Cir. 1967).
22. 155 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 257 F.2d 538 (2d
Cir. 1958),
vacated, 359 U.S. 26 (1959), on remand, 180 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), aff'd, 282
F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
23.

Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
24. 149 F. Supp. 11 (E.D.
Va. 1957).

Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959).
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while he was descending the ladder from the ship to the deck of the floating
crane. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
held that under the Sieracki decision the soldier possessed the same rights
as a stevedore in like circumstances.2 5 In United States v. The Washington,26 the dependents of four soldiers killed in a collision between a
government vessel and a privately owned tanker likewise recovered in
suits against the private shipowner.
An additional collateral problem, that of double recovery with regard
to damages, arises when servicemen win suits against civilians. As a
general rule, under a doctrine known as the collateral source rule, compensation received by an injured party from a source wholly independent of
the wrongdoer will not mitigate damages recoverable from the party causing
the injury.2 7 In the Caudill case, 28 for example, in allowing recovery by
the plaintiff, the court included in the computation of damages the plaintiff's
medical and hospital expenses despite the fact that they were gratuitously
furnished by the federal government. 29 Although subject to criticism as
contrary to the view that tort damages are purely compensatory, the collateral source rule recognizes that multiple indemnification does not necessarily impose an increased burden on the tortfeasor. If a windfall is to be
conferred, the injured party holds a greater claim thereto than the wrongdoer. 30 Moreover, the injured party, in reality, may never be fully "made
whole" by pecuniary awards. This is clearly evident in the principal case
where plaintiff lost his sense of sight. The government's statutory obligations, whatever the compensation may be, are not deductible from a
judicial claim for damages since these compensatory rights of servicemen
31
are independent rights not created, but merely matured, by the injury.
25. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).

It is significant to note that recourse against the private tortfeasor is the only
judicial remedy available to injured servicemen when the injury occurs incident to the
performance of military duties. Under such circumstances a serviceman can not sue
the United States or his superior officers; his exclusive remedy rests in gratuitous
compensation granted him by federal statutes. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950) ; Mattos v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Cal. 1967). See Servicemen's
and Veterans' Survivor Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 301-902 (1964).
26. 172 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Va. 1959), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Texas Co.,
272 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1959).
27. See Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages,
46 MINN. L. tv. 669 (1962).
28. 149 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1957).
29. Id. at 17 n.2.
[I]t cannot logically be maintained that these enactments were brought about
or had in view any thought of relieving those who were guilty of wrongdoing
towards any one engaged in the military or naval service of the United States.
Cunnien v. Superior Iron Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 186, 184 N.W. 767, 772 (1921).
30. Collateral source funds are usually created through the prudence and foresight of persons other than the tortfeasor, frequently including the injured person
himself. They are intended for the benefit of the injured person, and not for that
of the person who injures him.
Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1962). The collateral source rule has been applied as federal law. See Caudill v. Victory Carriers,
Inc., 149 F. Supp. 11, 17 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1957).
31. United States v. The Washington, 172 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Va.), aff'd
Published
by Villanova
School
of Law
sub nor.,
United University
States v.Charles
Texas Widger
Co., 272
F.2d
711 Digital
(4th Repository,
Cir. 1959) 1968
; Cunnien v.
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Where the Coast Guard is involved, still another consideration is
pertinent. Legal rights of recovery for maritime rescue operations are
governed by the unique maritime rules of salvage. Under this doctrine a
salvor is granted an award for voluntarily assisting distressed vessels.
There is no legal duty generally placed upon seamen to render such aid,
and the salvage award is an inducement to masters and their crews to
incur the dangers that salvage operations entail.3 2 Since members of the
Coast Guard are duty-bound to aid derelict ships or vessels in distress on
navigable waters, they cannot claim a salvage award.3 3 Private salvors
who are injured in a successful salvage effort or who incur greater risk
than others so involved often receive increased salvage awards. Such an
award is not compensatory, but rather a grant in recognition of the peril
faced by an injured salvor.3 4 Thus, in one respect, Coast Guard membership adversely affects the plaintiff by denying him rights that he would
otherwise have under the rules of salvage. Men in other services, however,
may recover both compensatory damages, as noted above, and in some
instances awards under applicable salvage rules.3 5 To deny Coast Guardmen recourse against civilian tortfeasors would place them in an inferior
position not only to civilians who may sue their employers and third party
tortfeasors, but also to men in the other services who are entitled to recover salvage awards.
In light of the liberal attitude evinced by the Supreme Court toward
the unseaworthiness doctrine, there appears to be no compelling reason to
deny the warranty of seaworthiness to Coast Guardmen.
James H. Freis

Superior Iron Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921). Where the government is not liable for the tortious injury to the claimant, the defendant has no right
of indemnity from the United States. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379,
404 (9th Cir. 1964). By statute, the government has a right of subrogation to the
injured serviceman's claims as a matter of federal fiscal policy. Thus the federal
government may recoup hospital and medical expenses disbursed to injured servicemen
or their dependents because of injuries inflicted by third parties. Third Party Liability
for Hospital and Medical Care, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (1964) ; see Phillips v. Trame,
252 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Ill. 1966). See generally United States v. The Manzanillo,
310 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1962) ; H-10 Water Taxi Co. v. United States, 252 F. Supp.
592 (S.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 379 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Cunnien v. Superior Iron
Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921).
32. M. NORRIS, supra note 19, § 1, at 1-4. "The essential characteristics of a
salvage service are that it be performed on navigable waters and that it be voluntarily
rendered by one under no existing duty to do so." Id. § 2, at 2-3.
33. Cf. 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 88 (1964).
34. M. NORRIS, supra note 19, § 220, at 355-56. Moreover, "[a] stingy award to'
a salvor contravenes good public policy." Lago Oil & Transp. Co. v. United States,
232 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 1956).
35. As such activity is not within the scope of the usual duties of soldiers and
sailors, such services may be construed as voluntary. Nolan v. A.H. Basse Rederi
Aktieselskab, 164 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Pa. 1958), modified, 267 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1959).'
See M. NORRIS, supra note 19, § 79, at 128. See also Dominguez v. The Schooner
Brindicate, 204 F. Supp. 817 (D.P.R. 1962) (Coast Guard Auxiliary members awarded
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
salvage).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

EAVESDROPPING -

ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-

LANCE Is WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
MUST BE MADE PURSUANT TO A COURT ORDER.

Katz v. United States (U.S. 1967)
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California for violation of a federal statute which
made illegal the interstate transmission of wagering information by wire.'
The conviction was based on evidence Federal Bureau of Investigation
agents had obtained by attaching an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of the public phone booth which petitioner used
to place the interstate calls. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction on the ground that "[t]here was
no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]. '"2 The
United States Supreme Court, in a seven to one decision,8 reversed,
holding that electronic eavesdropping, whether or not it is accompanied by
a physical trespass, constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning
of the fourth amendment; and that, in order to comply with the dictates
of .that amendment, eavesdropping must be made pursuant to a court
order. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
The Supreme Court first addressed itself to the problem of wiretapping in Olmstead v. United States.4 There the Court held that the
interception of defendant's telephone conversation was not prohibited by
the fourth amendment because: (1) there could be no search without a
physical trespass, 5 and (2) there could be no seizure of a conversation
since words were intangibles, and the fourth amendment was intended
to protect tangibles. 6 In Goldman v. United States,7 the Court reaffirmed
these principles and extended them to the area of electronic eavesdropping.
Subsequent to that decision, however, the Court has whittled away at
these espoused principles. Implicitly in Silverman v. United States8
and explicitly in Wong Sun v. United States,9 the Court held that words,
notwithstanding their intangible nature, could be seized within the mean1. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1964).
2. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
3. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5. Id. at 466.
6. Id. at 464.
7. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Mr. Justice Roberts rejected the petitioner's argument
that electronic surveillance should be distinguished from wiretapping on the ground
that, "the distinction is too nice for practical application of the Constitutional guarantee .... Id. at 135.
8. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
9. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
It follows from our holding in Silverman v. United States ...that the Fourth
Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as
against the more traditional seizure of "papers and effects."
Published
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
Id. atby485.
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ing of the fourth amendment. Yet the physical trespass principle of
Olmstead, in spite of constant criticism from both commentators 0 and
judges," proved much more durable, and served as the basis for judicial
sanction of the use of such methods by law enforcement agencies until
it was overruled in the instant case. 1 2 With the demise of the trespass
principle, it is certain that Olmstead has been entirely overruled and that
wiretapping and all types of electronic eavesdropping have been brought
within the purview of the fourth amendment.
The Katz opinion is not an attempt by the Supreme Court to solve,
or even establish definitive guidelines with respect to, all of the problems
which eavesdropping has raised. To the contrary, the opinion is short and
often vague and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the Court has clarified its
position on several fundamental aspects of eavesdropping.
The Court has clearly enunciated that, at least for the present, the
basic criteria against which eavesdropping must be measured is the unreasonable search and seizure requirement of the fourth amendment
rather than the general right to privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut3 Mr.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, declared that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance,' u 4 and that one
of these penumbras is an affirmative right to privacy. Some commentators had expressed the view that the Court would employ this rationale
to prohibit all electronic eavesdropping as violative of the right to
privacy.' 5 Furthermore, in the recent case of Berger v. New York,' 6
although the Court focused on the defects of New York's permissive

10. See, e.g., King, Wire Tapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected
Constitutional Consideration,66 DICK. L. Rev. 17 (1961); Sullivan, Wiretapping and
Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 59 (1965) ; 21

N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Rev. 109 (1965). The gravamen of most attacks is that the sophistication of electronic surveillance equipment has obviated any need for a physical
trespass, thus leaving Silverman in a vacuum. The effect of this technological sophistication is to neutralize the only protection that the fourth amendment has been able
to provide individuals where electronic surveillance is concerned.
11. See, e.g., the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), where he stated:
The concept of "an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises," on

which the present decision rests, seems to me to be beside the point. Was not
the wrong in both cases done when the intimacies of the home were tapped,
recorded, or revealed?
Id. at 513.
12. Most commentators expressed the opinion that in Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967), the Court, by its treatment of Olmstead, Goldman, and Silverman,
sub silentio overruled Olmstead's "trespass" principle. See, e.g., Comment, 1 IND.
LrGAL F. 250, 268 (1967) ; 19 SYRACUsE L. Riv. 133 (1967).
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Id. at 484. See generally 31 LAw & CONT1MP. PROB. 251 (1966) ; Comments
on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. lv.197 (1964).
15. Note, 40 SiT. JOHN'S L. Rgv. 59, 65-66 (1965) ; see Schwartz, The Wiretapping Problem Today, 2 CRIM. L. BULL. Dec. 1966, at 3. Some commentators have
limited their advocacy for an absolute prohibition to cases where "constitutionally
protected areas" were involved. Note, 18 S.C.L. Rav. 835, 843-46 (1966).
16. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
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statute with

respect

to that clause

amendment which requires that warrants "particularly .

of the
.

fourth

. [describe] the

place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized,"'17 there were
intimations that the majority actually was concerned with protecting an
affirmative right to privacy rather than the negative right to be free from
all unreasonable searches and seizures, though not all searches and seizures.' 8 But the Katz Court has not chosen to utilize this latter approach.
Petitioner Katz framed his defense so as to raise the issue of his
right to privacy rather than his right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. He proceeded by arguing that since a phone booth is a
"constitutionally protected area," any search or seizure should be a violation of his right to privacy.' 9 Mr. Justice Stewart, 20 writing for the
majority, rejected this approach. Instead, he chose to focus attention on
what had been a neglected aspect of the fourth amendment, that it was
designed to protect "people, not places,"' 1 and thus "the correct solution
of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.' "22 With respect to
petitioner's right to privacy, he succinctly concluded that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to
privacy.' ",23
17. U.S. CoNsTr. amend. IV.
18. Throughout its opinion, the Court couches its discussion in terms of a right
to privacy:
It is now well settled that "the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has
been declared enforceable against the States .... " "The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusions by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment - is basic to a free society."
388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Mr. Justice Douglas, in
his concurring opinion, is more explicit in enunciating his position that the fourth
amendment "does not make every search constitutional provided there is a warrant
that is technically adequate." Id. at 67.
19. Brief for petitioner at 12-14, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. Mr. Justice Stewart's position on the right to privacy as found in the penumbra
of the Bill of Rights was made vividly clear when he joined Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Griswold:
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally
guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional
guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted
in meaning. This fact is well illustrated by the use of the term "right of privacy"
as a comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
"unreasonable searches and seizures." "Privacy" is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also, on
the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things
other than searches and seizures. . . . For these reasons I get nowhere in this
case by talk about a constitutional "right of privacy" as an emanation from one or
more constitutional provisions.
381 U.S. 479, 509-10 (1965).
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Other decisions dealing
with eavesdropping were primarily concerned with intrusions into a "constitutionally
protected area." See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57, 59 (1967) ; Lanza v.
New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962) ; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
510, 512 (1961).
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
23. Id. The Court continued:
That Amendment [the fourth] protects individual privacy against certain kinds
intrusion
[unreasonable
and seizures].
. . Other proPublishedofby governmental
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The Katz decision also clarifies the Court's position on notice. Re24
treating from the position taken in Berger, Justice Stewart specifically
eliminates any requirement of advance notice. A conventional warrant
ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of the intended search, but it is
obvious that the value of eavesdropping is completely vitiated if the
suspect is given notice that he is under surveillance. The opinion perfunctorily solved this problem by placing electronic surveillance within
25
the rationale of Ker v. California when it stated that: "[O]fficers need
not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized
search if such an2 6announcement would provoke . . . the destruction of

critical evidence."
The instant case also clearly established at least one prerequisite
which must be met if electronic surveillance is to comply with the standards of the fourth amendment - that the eavesdropping be made pursuant to a court order. Mr. Justice Stewart concluded:
The government agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent

justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment," a pro-

of the kind of
cedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition
27
electronic surveillance involved in this case.

The Court's reliance on antecedent justification as an effective means
of safeguarding an individual's rights where electronic surveillance is
visions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person's general right to privacy - his
left largely to the law of the inright to be let alone by other people - is ...
dividual States.
Id. at 350-51.
24. In commenting upon the defects of the New York permissive eavesdropping
statute, the Court stated:
Finally, the statute's procedure, necessarily because its success depends on secrecy,
has no requirement for notice as do conventional warrants, nor does it overcome
this defect by requiring some showing of special facts. On the contrary, it
permits unconsented entry without any showing of exigent circumstances. Such
a showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice, would appear more important
ineavesdropping . . .than that required when conventional procedures of search
and seizure are utilized.
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967).
25. 374 U.S. 23, 37-41 (1963).
26. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967).
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). It would appear that Mr.
Justice Stewart's reference to the "kind of electronic surveillance involved in this
case" was necessitated by the Court's inability to agree on the issue of whether a court
order would be necessary in a situation involving national security. In footnote 23 of
the majority opinion he specifically stated that this question was not presented by
this case.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, in which Mr. Justice Brennan
joined, is quite clear that in spite of Mr. Justice White's statement in his concurring
opinion that,
We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if
the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General,
has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic
surveillance as reasonable. ...
(Id. at 364), even in cases of national emergency the warrant procedure would be a
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
requirement. Id. at 359-60.
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involved was presaged by two recent Supreme Court cases. In Osborn
v. United States28 the Court affirmed a conviction which was based on
evidence obtained by the use of a "bugged" agent.2 9 Rather than mechanically following Lopez v. United States,80 which held that the
"bugged" agent was not a means of electronic surveillance, the majority
opinion written by Mr. Justice Stewart was based on the much more narrow ground that the requirement of "antecedent justification before a
magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment" 3' had been met.
In the second case, Berger v. New York, 2 the Court held New York's
permissive eavesdropping statute void on its face because it did not provide "adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures,' '3 a guarantee of "the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a neutral and detached
authority be interposed between the police and the public . . .,,4
Of much greater practical importance than either definitely bringing
electronic eavesdropping within the fourth amendment or firmly establishing antecedent authorization as a prerequisite to its lawful use is the
issue of whether eavesdropping can meet the requirements of the fourth
amendment.35 One explicative which has been given for the Court's apparent hesitancy to overrule Olmstead's "trespass" concept is that the
effect of doing so would be to prohibit all such surveillance. This view is
based on the belief that since the words which are to be seized are not
yet in existence when the warrant is applied for, it could not possibly describe with particularity the "things to be seized" as required by the
fourth amendment. 30 The Katz Court gives this difficult issue only
cursory examination, leaving its position on this point both vague and
inconclusive.
The majority is content to quote language from Berger37 which intimates a possible solution to the particularity problem. The Berger Court,
discussing the court order which authorized the eavesdropping in Osborn v.
8
United States,3
stated that "[tihe need for particularity and evidence
of reliability in the showing required when judicial authorization of a
search is sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping."3 9
28. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
29. A "bugged" agent is one who, while talking to another person, surreptitiously
records the conversation.
30. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
31. 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966).
32. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
33. Id. at 60.
34. Id. at 54.
35. The fact that the Court now requires a court order does not necessarily
preclude the possibility that the order may not meet other fourth amendment requirements. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465-66 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
36. See, e.g., The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. Pv. 40 187 (1961) ;
Comment, 1 IND. LEGAL F. 250, 260 (1967); Note, 18 S.C.L. REv. 835, 837 (1966).

But see Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View,

44

L. Rxv. 891, 913 (1960).
37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 (1967), quoting, Berger v. United
States, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
38. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
Published39.by Berger
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Nevertheless, the Berger Court approved the court order in Osborn because it "afforded similar protections to those that are present in the
use of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence."' 40 One of the similar safeguards which the Berger Court discussed was that "the [court] order described the type of conversation
sought with particularity ....,,41The Katz Court makes no attempt to
explain further this broad approach of "similar protections" to which it
has drawn attention, or to apply it specifically to the issue of particularity.
In projecting on its position with respect to the particularity requirement and the court order which it has made a precondition to lawful
eavesdropping, it only can be posited that on a broad level the safeguards
which will be incorporated into the court order now required will not
necessarily be the exact protections which a search warrant for tangible
items provides. On the question of particularly describing the "words to be
seized," it would seem that a specific description of the "type of conversation" will fulfill that requirement of the fourth amendment. If this
approach is adopted, the court order, while protecting the individual's
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures as does a conventional warrant, will also reflect the inherent peculiarities which intangibles
such as speech present.
Several other issues raised by Katz are not given the benefit of a
definite stand by the Court. One such issue is probable cause. There is
no doubt that a showing of probable cause will be required; however,
what will constitute probable cause for issuance of an eavesdropping order

is questionable. The reason for this uncertainty is that in discussing the
rather settled requirements of probable cause, Mr. Justice Stewart may
have included an additional requirement of need. 42 While this concept
appears only to be in its formative stages, it could conceivably be developed and utilized by the Court as an effective tool for limiting eavesdropping to those instances where it can be shown to be the only means
available.

43

Another issue which is raised and left unanswered by this decision is
whether the warrant must be returned. In listing the safeguards which

were denied the petitioner because there was no judicial sanction to the
search, the court includes the failure of the police "to notify the authoriz40. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. [Ilt is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a

duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation ...
could constitutionally have authorized . ..the very limited search and seizure that
the Government asserts in fact took place.
389 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added).
43. See Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative
Proposal, 52 COLUm. L. Riv. 165, 203 (1952) ; Comment, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 355, 375
(1966) ; Comment, 1 IND. LWGAL F. 250, 265 (1967). If this approach is adopted, it
could serve as an alternative to the approach suggested by some commentators that
the Court might require more precise facts before finding probable cause. See Comhttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
ment, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 355, 374 (1966) ; Comment, I IND. LEGAL F. 250, 266 (1967).
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ing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized."' 44 It is possible that
the Court will make the return of the warrant a constitutional requirement where a warrant authorizing eavesdropping has been issued.45 If
such return is required it could serve as an effective means of implementing the federal exclusionary rule 46 by providing the courts with a means
of comparing the evidence obtained by the search with the precise scope
47
and limitations under which the warrant was issued.
A further issue, the duration of the surveillance, is merely alluded
to by the Katz Court. While Katz apparently sanctions an eavesdrop
which lasts for a very brief period, approximately ten minutes, the Court
previously had held that a court order which authorized an electronic
eavesdrop for a two month period was too long. 48

Between these two

extremes there exists a wide spectrum of possibilities which the lower
courts, at least for now, will have to work out for themselves.
The Katz decision marks a retreat from the Court's position as
found in the Berger case, where, due to the myriad of requirements which
were apparently established, it was seriously questioned whether the
Court would allow any electronic eavesdropping. The degree of the retreat, however, might prove to be a very limited one. The Court's use of
Osborn v. United States,49 a "bugged" agent case, as support for propositions concerning other means of electronic surveillance may be subsequently undermined by the previously employed technique of distinguishing the "bugged" agent from other types of electronic surveillance. Also,
the very limited invasion of privacy presented by the fact situation in the
present case could have been a major factor in persuading the Court to
bypass invocation of the concept of a general right to privacy.
Robert R. Reeder
44. 389 U.S. at 356.
45. Presently the return of search warrants is governed by statute or court rule.
CRIM. P. 41(d).
46. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule subsequently has been held to apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
47. The use of the exclusionary rule would prevent a situation such as was presented in People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1965),
where, based solely upon information obtained during a wiretap authorized on a
showing of probable cause of grand larceny, the police obtained sufficient evidence to
prosecute the larceny suspect for illegal possession of firearms. The conviction was
reversed on the grounds that there was a search for "mere evidence" as proscribed
by Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The "mere evidence" rule was
recently overruled by the Supreme Court in Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967).

See, e.g., F4D. R.

48. Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
49. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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Marchetti v. United States (U.S. 1968)
Grosso v. United States (U.S. 1968)
Haynes v. United States (U.S. 1968)
In separate criminal proceedings, petitioners Marchetti and Grosso
were indicted for violations of the wagering tax provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.1 Petitioner Marchetti was charged with willful failure to
register 2 his name and address, and other information concerning his
gambling operations, with Internal Revenue officials and with willful failure
to pay the fifty dollar occupational tax 3 levied on all persons engaged in
the business of receiving wagers. Indictments against petitioner Grosso
alleged, inter alia, willful failure to pay the ten percent excise tax4 imposed
on all wagers accepted by him. Convictions were obtained in each instance
and were affirmed by federal circuit courts of appeals 5 over timely objections that the particular sections of the taxing scheme violated fifth amendment guarantees against self-incrimination.
Petitioner Haynes was convicted of knowingly posessing an unregis-

tered firearm in violation of section 5851 of the Internal Revenue Code.6

Fifth amendment challenges were rejected, and the United States Court
7
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed each conviction holding: (1) that the requirements that gamblers register and pay
1. INT. Rv. CoDt of 1954, §§ 4401-23. Briefly, the statutory system operates as
follows: Section 4401 imposes a ten percent excise tax on all wagers placed. In
addition, section 4411 requires that an annual occupation tax of fifty dollars be paid
by all those subject to taxation under section 4401. Pursuant to section 4412, all
persons liable for these special taxes must register with the appropriate revenue
official, and according to section 6806(c), must conspicuously display a special revenue
stamp at his place of business as evidence of payment of the occupation tax. Section
6107 requires that revenue officials maintain lists of those who have paid the taxes
and also requires that copies of these lists be furnished to local prosecutors upon
request. Daily records of wagering transactions are required to be kept by the taxpayer and are subject to frequent inspection under sections 4403 and 4423. Finally,
section 4422 provides that payment of the special taxes does not exempt the taxpayer
from penalties arising under any state or federal law prohibiting gambling.
2. INT. Riv. CoDe of 1954, § 4412. Willful failure to pay or evasion of the various
tax provisions are severely punished by fines, imprisonment, or both. See generally
INT. Rev. CODX of 1954, §§ 7201-75.
3. INT. REv. COD of 1954, § 4411.
4. INT. Rev. COD4 of 1954, § 4401.
5. United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1966) ; United States v.
Costello, 352 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'd sub nom., Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968).
6. INT. Riv. CODe of 1954, § 5851. The section makes it unlawful to possess or
receive a firearm which has been made or transferred in violation of any related section
of the Code or which has not been registered pursuant to section 5841. Possession
alone creates a presumption of unlawful possession under section 5158.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
7. Haynes v. United States, 372 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967).
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the fifty dollar occupational tax created substantial risks of self-incrimination in that compliance therewith significantly enhanced the likelihood of
criminal prosecutions under both federal and state laws, and as such,
non-compliance with those requirements can not be criminally punished
when a proper fifth amendment defense is raised; (2) that the requirement
that gamblers file special monthly reports as a condition to payment of the
excise tax leads to the production of readily incriminating evidence, and,
therefore, the fifth amendment precludes a criminal conviction premised
on failure to pay that tax; and (3) that a proper fifth amendment claim
provides a full defense to prosecutions either for failure to register or for
possession of an unregistered firearm under the National Firearms Act
since such provisions construed together require admission of unlawful
possession. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) ; Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) ; Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S.
85 (1968).
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination reflects a
policy that the public's interest in effectively enforcing criminal laws must
defer to an individual's right not to aid the government in procuring his
own conviction. 8 From its early application to per se criminal actions,
the privilege has been judicially applied in legislative and civil proceedings9
where the evidence disclosed was likely to lead to a criminal prosecution.
Contraposed to this individual right has been the federal government's use
of its implied powers to discover, control, and thwart organized crime
through comprehensive tax and regulatory schemes. 10
The present gambling taxes, since their enactment in 1951 as a
method of crime control and a source of revenue, have been utilized by
law enforcement officials as a means of obtaining evidence to be used in the
prosecution of organized gambling interests conducted in violation of
federal" and state 1 2 laws. Similarly, the Code's provisions regarding
8. See Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
65 COLUM. L. Rev. 681 (1965). Mr. Justice Bradley speaking for the Court in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), characterized the privilege as:
[A]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit
his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government.
Id. at 631-32. This seemingly absolute rule concerning papers and documents has been
limited by judicial characterization. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)
(the "required records doctrine").
9. See, e.g., Empspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
10. See McKee, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal Gambling Tax, 5 DuKt
1.J. 86 (1956). Items considered to be dangerous or unfavorable to public opinion
have borne the brunt of federal tax and regulatory measures. For examples, see Note,
Self-Incrimination and the Federal Excise Tax on Wagering, 76 YALE L.J. 839
n.5 (1967).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Zizzo, 338 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 915 (1965) (wagering forms used to show violation of interstate travel in
aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1964)).
12. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) ; State v. Mills, 229 La.
758, 86 So. 2d 895 (1956) ; Commonwealth v. Fiorine, 202 Pa. Super. 88, 195 A.2d 119
(1963). For a complete listing of state gambling statutes see United States v.
Published
by Villanova
University
Charles
Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
Marchetti,
390 U.S.
39, 44-45
n.5 (1968).
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firearms provided an effective check on the manufacture, sale, transfer, and
possession of weapons known to be extensively used by organized crime
for unlawful purposes.
The constitutionality of the wagering tax scheme has been twice tested
against the strictures of the fifth amendment and twice upheld by the
United States Supreme Court. In 1953, in United States v. Kahriger,13
the Court ruled that registration was a valid condition precedent to the
payment of a lawful tax. In support of this stand, the Court adopted the
rationale of United States v. Sullivan1 4 which had held that the fifth
amendment did not excuse a taxpayer's refusal to file a required tax return
since "[fit would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the
fifth amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the
amount of his income because it had been made in crime."' 15 More importantly, the Kahriger Court narrowly restricted the prospective application of
the privilege against self-incrimination by reasoning that it related "only to
past acts, not to future acts that may or may not be committed."' 16 Following Kahriger, in 1955 in Lewis v. United States,17 the Court further
reasoned that "there is no constitutional right to gamble," and consequently
those who chose to gamble could not avoid payment of the tax." The
necessary result of such reasoning was an implied waiver of constitutional
rights since the choice to gamble and be taxed meant the implicit choice
not to object to the use of information given to the taxing authority. 19
The National Firearms Act 20 has also been considered by the
Supreme Court. In 193721 and again in 193922 the Court upheld the Act

as a valid regulatory tax; however, no opinion was voiced23regarding selfincrimination since no fifth amendment issues were raised.
13. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
14. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
15. Id. at 263-64. It should be noted that the Sullivan holding relates to a
complete refusal to file a tax return. The decision indicates that objections to a particular question are permissible.
16. 345 U.S. at 32.
17. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
18. Id. at 423. The Court used this rationale to eliminate the compulsion aspect
of compelled self-incrimination. Voluntary registration and payment of the gambling
tax, according to the Court, could not be considered to be compelled in the fifth
amendment sense.
19. See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. Rsv. 1,
37-38 (1949) ; Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65 COLUM. L. Rev. 681, 689-90 (1965). In dealing with the implied waiver
analysis the Court in Marchetti stated:
We cannot agree that the constitutional privilege is meaningfully waived merely
because those "inherently suspect of criminal activities" have been commanded

either to cease wagering or to provide information incriminating to themselves,

and have ultimately elected to do neither.
390 U.S. at 52.
20. INT. Rxv. CODJ of 1954, §§ 5801-5862.
21. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).

22. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).

23. The constitutionality of section 5841's registration requirement has been
challenged on self-incrimination grounds in lower courts, and several federal courts
have held the registration section unconstitutional in that it required an admission of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
unlawful possession as proscribed by section 5851. See Dugan v. United States, 341
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The issues before the Court in the instant cases were therefore reduced to whether these federal crime control methods were inconsistent
with the fifth amendment and, if so, whether the cases sustaining them
should be overruled. In this regard, it is significant that after the Supreme
Court determined that the fourteenth amendment required that the tenets
of the fifth amendment be applied in state criminal proceedings, 24 federalstate cooperation in the use of compelled admissions was further hindered
by the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n.25 In Murphy, it was held that evidence compelled under a grant

of immunity by one sovereign government could not be used in a subsequent criminal action by another governmental entity. 26 Furthermore,
the constitutional deficiencies of Kahriger and Lewis became more apparent
in 1965 when the Supreme Court nullified the communist registration requirements of the Subversive Activities Control Act 2 7 in Albertson v.
SACB.25 The Court declared that despite immunity from prosecution
under that Act, compliance with its registration provisions necessitated the
disclosure of information which would establish a'prima facie violation of
the membership clause of the Smith Act 29 and supply federal prosecutors
with "investigatory leads," thereby creating a substantial risk of later selfincrimination. The Court distinguished the Sullivan rationale by indicating that the questions on the income tax return were neutral on their
face and were not designed to elicit admissions of criminal acts, whereas
30
in Albertson the opposite was true.
The Court's analysis in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes closely follows
the approach used in Albertson and is based on an examination of the
type of information required by the statutory scheme, the purposes of its
31
acquisition, and the effects of its disclosure to law enforcement officials.
Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, recognizes this approach as
being manifestly inconsistent with the narrow and restrictive rationale
F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1965); Russell v. United States, 306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Fleish, 227 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Mich. 1964) ; cf. Page v. United
States, 282 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1960) (court refused to rule on constitutionality of
section 5841 until Supreme Court ruling).
24. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
26. Id. at 77-78.
27. 50 U.S.C. § 783(r) (1964).
28. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
30. In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face
and directed at the public at large, but here they are directed at a highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Petitioners' claims are not asserted
in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry
in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form's

questions in context might involve . . . the admission of a crucial element of
a crime.
382 U.S. at 79.
31. The Court notes that gambling is prohibited in every state except Nevada,
and that local enforcement methods have in one instance made possession of a federal
tax stamp a misdemeanor. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44-48 nn.5
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
& 8 (1968).
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supporting Kahriger and Levis, and therefore requiring that those cases
be explicitly overruled in Marchetti. Petitioner Grosso's objection to
payment of the excise tax, however, presented a more difficult question
than Marchetti's refusal to comply with the registration section of the
tax law. Whereas in Marchetti a statutory mandate required disclosure
of the tax registration lists to federal or state law enforcement officials
upon request, 3 2 there was no explicit obligation that the excise tax returns

filed by petitioner Grosso be similarly disclosed. Seemingly, the holdingin Sullivan barred an outright refusal to file a required income tax return;
nevertheless the Court found Grosso's objection to be well taken. In again
distinguishing Sullivan, the Court reasoned:
[U]nlike the income tax return at issue in United States v. Sullivan
• . . petitioner's submission of an excise tax payment, and his replies
to the questions on the attendant return, would directly and unavoidably have served to incriminate him; his claim of privilege as
to the entire tax payment procedure was therefore neither "extreme"
nor "extravagant. " 33
The problem presented in Haynes concerned internal statutory defects
rather than the extrinsic effects 34 present in Marchetti and Grosso. The
incriminatory effects of the firearm possession and registration sections
of the Internal Revenue Code are more subtle and require closer statutory
analysis. The Code's control of firearms outlines numerous requirements
which must be met in order for a person to legally transfer, import, or
make a firearm. 35 A failure to comply with these provisions is criminally
punished under section 5861.30 Section 5841, the registration section of
the Code, provides that one who possesses a firearm in violation of these
requirements must register the fact of his possession. Clearly then, com32. See note 1 supra.

33. 390 U.S. 62, 67 (1968)

(emphasis added).

In a collateral argument the

Court also determined that the "required records doctrine" announced in Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), did not preclude petitioner Grosso's fifth amendment claim. The doctrine permits the use of records over a self-incrimination objection
where the governmental inquiry is essentially regulatory, the records are a kind customarily kept, and also have assumed "public aspects." The Court reasoned that the
inquiries in the excise tax returns were not of an essentially regulatory nature nor
were they "public" merely because the government had expressed a desire to obtain
gambling information. The fact that the Court requested argument on this issue indicates a willingness to re-examine the vitality of the required records limitation
on the privilege against self-incrimination.
34. An internal statutory defect in the fifth amendment sense exists where the
statutory scheme is so constructed that compliance with one section of the statute will
compel the defendant to admit to a violation of a related section of the same act.
Extrinsic dangers of self-incrimination lie in the fear that disclosure of the required
information will lead to prosecution for a violation of an unrelated criminal statute.
The best example of this is the fear that state gambling prosecutions would be
facilitated by a local prosecutor's use of registration lists maintained by federal
tax officers.
35. INT. Rpv. COD of 1954, § 5811 (transfer tax) ; § 5812(b) (notice of exemption) ; § 5813 (affixing revenue stamps) ; § 5814 (order form) ; § 5844 (exportation)
§ 5845 (importation) ; § 5821 (tax on manufacture).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
36. INT. R-v. CODv of 1954, § 5861.
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pliance with the registration provision compels the individual to admit
that he has violated some other Code section and therefore to incriminate
himself. Petitioner Haynes' conviction was based on a violation of section
5851, the section which defines the act of unlawful possession. According
to this section, in order to lawfully possess a firearm the possessor must
have registered pursuant to section 5841. Since compliance with section
5851 turned on registration which necessarily disclosed incriminating admissions, the Court reasoned that the practical effects of both this section
and section 5841 were identical and, therefore, that neither section could
be enforced over a fifth amendment objection. 37
The importance of the instant decisions lies mainly in the Court's
approach in analyzing the effects of an entire statutory scheme and in
its willingness to look beyond stated tax or commerce justifications to
ascertain the seriousness of the statute's effects on protected rights. In
capsule, where federal tax or regulatory measures are directed at specific
groups inherently suspect of criminal activity, the statutory methods used
to obtain information will demand close judicial scrutiny. This critical
approach, coupled with the revitalized rule that compelled admissions producing a "link in the chain of evidence"' 8 leading to criminal prosecutions
are also within the fifth amendment privilege, indicates that other areas
of special taxation and regulation requiring such admissions will demand
similar treatment when a defense to their enforcement is predicated on fifth
amendment protections.
Three of these other areas should fall within the holdings of Marchetti,
Grosso, and Haynes, the two most obvious being the taxation and registration imposed on those who deal in narcotic drugs 39 or marihuana.4 0

In

these taxing measures, as in the firearms and gambling tax statutes, both
intrinsic and extrinsic dangers of self-incrimination are evident in the
statutory design. Registration under these drug control statutes compels
an admission of a violation of the possession requirements of related
sections of the same statutory schemes, 41 thus an example of the intrinsic
37. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 94 (1968).
38. In defining the scope of the fifth amendment privilege the Court in Hoffman

v. United States enunciated the "link in the chain" concept thusly:

The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves
support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a . . . crime.
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
39. INT. Rzv. CODS of 1954, §§ 4701-07, §§ 4721-26.
40. INT. Rvv. CODe of 1954, §§ 4741-46, §§ 4751-57.
41. Section 4722 requires that a person, upon first entering into dealings in narcotic drugs as defined in section 4721, register. Under section 4724(c), it is unlawful
to possess narcotic drugs without having registered and paid the occupational tax.
A close analysis of these sections reveals that one entering into dealings in narcotic
drugs is likely to be in possession of such drugs prior to registering. Subsequent
registration therefore would require an admission to possession prior to registering;
such an admission constitutes unlawful possession under section 4724(c). It is also
important to note that the cases upholding the validity of these sections have relied
on the rationale of the Kahriger and Lewis cases now rejected by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Palma v. United States, 261 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Reyes v. United States,
258 F.2d
(9th University
Cir. 1958).Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
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dangers of self-incrimination presented in Haynes. Also, since virtually
every state criminally punishes possession or the unauthorized sale or
transfer of narcotic drugs, 42 the extrinsic risks of producing "links in
the chain of evidence" leading to state prosecutions are also present. The
fact that no immunity is granted under either statutory scheme further
substantiates an argument that these statutory methods are constitutionally
unsound on fifth amendment grounds.
Two other requirements which accompany the taxation of drugs are
that all transfers are to be made pursuant to special order forms to be
obtained from the government 43 and that those subject to pay special taxes
44
must file special tax returns similar to the excise tax form in Grosso.
Compliance with either of these measures compels the taxpayer to disclose information similar to that required by the registration provisions, 45
and seemingly the same fifth amendment objections to their enforcement
could be raised.
The third area subject to the broad implications of Marchetti is the
present control of international traffic in narcotics. Present legislation
requires that addicts and narcotics violators register upon entry or departure from the country. 46 Here also, compelled registration presents
the possibility that law enforcement officials will be furnished with "investigatory leads" which may uncover previously undetected criminal activity. Although this regulatory measure is grounded in the commerce clause,
there is no apparent reason why the rules announced in the decisions under
consideration should not reach from the tax area into other areas where
fifth amendment rights are threatened.
The aforementioned statutes are examples of federal legislation which
fall within the rules espoused in Marchetti. Other areas in which registration statutes are used border more closely on the edge of criminality47
42. For a complete listing of state narcotics laws see W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS
app. B (1962).
43. The order form requirements apply both to the transfers of narcotic drugs,
INT. REv. COD4 of 1954, § 4705, and to transfers of marihuana, INT. RMV. CoDn of
1954, § 4742.
44. As with the order forms, both dealers in narcotic drugs and marihuana must
AND THt LAW

file special income tax return forms. INT. REv. CODZ of 1954, § 4732(b) (narcotic
drugs) ; INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4754 (marihuana).
45. The information required in the order forms and tax returns is more detailed
than the information disclosed by registration. In addition to the names and addresses
of the taxpayers, these sections require disclosure of the dates of all sales or transfers
of either of the drugs, the quantity transferred, and the names of the vendors or purchasers as the case may be. See notes 43 and 44 supra.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964). The accompanying immunity statute to this regulation is subject to some scrutiny since a grant of immunity lies solely in the discretion
of the Attorney General. For a complete analysis of the effects of immunity legislation see Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 327 (1966) ; Note,
The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
47. See, e.g., INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, §§ 5171-72 (registration of distilleries)
§ 5174 (registration of stills) ; § 5802 (importers, dealers, and manufacturers of firearms) ; § 4804(d) (manufacturers of white phosphorous matches) ; §§ 4461-63 (coin
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
operated gaming devices).
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and will present proper cases for the Court to expand or narrow the
doctrines now enunciated. It should also be noted, however, that stronger
arguments relating to the public interest in health and the concomitant
need for regulation can be made in the area of drug control than can be
raised to support a public need to control gambling. It may be possible
to read Marchetti narrowly as holding only that legislation specifically
designed to serve as a device to entrap criminals into admissions of guilt
will come in conflict with the privilege against self-incrimination. A more
realistic evaluation of the Court's scrutinous treatment of the tax and
regulatory measures in the instant cases, however, indicates that future
analysis will be based on a broader reading of these opinions.
A stronger indication that the present decisions will be applied liberally
is that in each of the instant cases the Court was presented with an alternative basis of decision. In both Marchetti and Grosso the Government
requested that the Court not completely nullify the tax statutes but rather
read a use restriction into the statutory scheme by holding that the
information obtained through these means could not be used to facilitate
criminal prosecutions. The Court refused to adopt this approach, however,
reasoning that to do so would defeat stated legislative purposes and thereby
result in usurpation of a solely legislative function. The Court in Marchetti
and Grosso also felt that because of the interdependency of the statutory
components it was unwise to "wield the constitutional knife surgically" 4
and incorrectly treat the individual sections of the Act as separate. In
Haynes, the Internal Revenue Code specifically designated unlawful possession and failure to register as separate and distinct offenses, but the
Court again reasoned that their necessary dependence one upon the other
required that they be treated together for purposes of determining their
effect on fifth amendment rights.
The Court's analysis in the instant cases recognizes the Government's
need for information in a properly formulated regulatory scheme while
concurrently pointing out that the exercise of government power to obtain
such information must not be designed to infringe upon protected rights.
Where governmental goals are properly regulation or taxation, informational objectives can be accomplished without a sacrifice of the privilege
against self-incrimination; however, this assumes the proper use of immunity
statutes which will preserve individual liberties while accomplishing valid
49
legislative needs.
Michael J. Izzo, Jr.

48. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 82 (1968)

(dissenting opinion).

49. See McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. Rnv. 193,

222-23.
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VAGRANCY NEW YORK'S VAGRANCY STATUTE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER.

Fenster v. Leary (N.Y. 1967)
On three separate occasions petitioner was arrested and charged with
vagrancy pursuant to section 887(1) of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure.' After his third arrest, the previous two resulting in acquittals,
petitioner sought a declaratory judgment on the statute's constitutionality.
The trial court dismissed the suit2 and petitioner appealed. In reversing,
the New York Court of Appeals held section 887(1) - the New York
vagrancy statute - unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and constituted an overreaching of the proper limitations of the police power in that it unreasonably made criminal individual conduct which has in no way been
demonstrated to have anything more than the most tenuous connection
with the prevention of crime. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229
N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
American vagrancy statutes are largely patterned after similar English
statutes which had their origin in the "Slavery Act" of 1547. 3 Since that
Act, it has been asserted that the purpose of vagrancy legislation is to
prevent crime by compelling "individuals to engage in some legitimate and
gainful occupation from which they might maintain themselves, and
thus remove temptations to lead a life of crime or become public charges. ' 4
Virtually all American jurisdictions 5 presently have vagrancy statutes
1. N.Y. COD. CRIM. PROC. § 887(1) (McKinney 1958), provides:

The following persons are vagrants:
1. A person who, not having visible means to maintain himself, lives
without employment.
N.Y. CoDe CRIM. PROC. § 892 (McKinney 1958) provides, for those convicted
of vagrancy, commitment at hard labor in either a penitentiary or county jail for not
more than six months.
Incident to a program of general penal reform, these sections were repealed
by the New York Legislature on July 20, 1965, to take effect on September 1, 1967.
L. 1967, c. 681, 90, N.Y. CODS CRIM. PROC. § 887 (McKinney Supp. 1967). The instant
action, however, was initiated before the repeal became effective.
2. Fenster v. Leary, 53 Misc. 2d 774, 279 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
3. 3 Edw. 6, c.3 (1547). The original English vagrancy statutes, 23 Edw. 3,
c.1 (1349) and 25 Edw. 3, c.1 (1350), treated vagrants (run-away serfs) as economic
criminals rather than as criminals in the traditional sense. Comment, The Vagrancy
Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv.
102, 104-16 & nn.22, 23 & 36 (1962).
4. People v. Banwer, 22 N.Y.S.2d 566, 569 (Magis. Ct. 1940) ; accord, District
of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; People v. Belcastro, 356
Ill.144, 148, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934). Some cases include, in addition to crime
prevention, objectives such as the general protection of society from its less desirable
elements, People v. Bell, 204 Misc. 117, 125 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Nassau County Ct.), aff'd,
306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953), and the prevention of persons becoming public
charges, People v. Forbes, 4 Park. Crim. R. 611, 614 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860) ; Morgan
v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 731, 191 S.E. 791 (1937). While a court may speak
generally of the many-faceted objectives of vagrancy legislation, only occasional
attention is paid to these latter mentioned objectives. See, e.g., Daniel v. State, 110
Ga. 915, 36 S.E. 293 (1900) ; Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. Rzv. 1203, 1217 (1953).
5. See Lacey, supra note 4, at 1208 n.20, where the author lists thirty-seven
states which at that time (1953) had vagrancy statutes. Three of those states listed,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
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whereby persons living in idleness, without employment, and having no
visible means of support, are subject to penal sanctions. The legislative
authority to enact these statutes has been found in the inherent police
power of the states, a power which permits state legislatures to enact
laws and regulations intended to guard and protect the health, safety, and
general welfare of the citizens of the state.6 Yet, while this power is
a broad one, it is not unlimited. 7 Like any other federal or state power, it
is restricted in its exercise by the constitutional requirements of due process
enunciated in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 8
Because of the minor nature of the crime, and the type of person
usually arrested, vagrancy convictions infrequently are appealed., When
vagrancy cases do reach appellate courts, the gravamen of most attacks
is that the statutes are unconstitutionally void because of their vagueness
- a procedural due process deficiency. 10 Thus far, however, state appellate courts have not been receptive to this line of attack." But, while the
"void for vagueness" argument seems to have been rejected in the state
courts, recent decisions indicate that it has continued vitality in the
12
federal courts.

in addition to New York, no longer have effective vagrancy legislation. California's
vagrancy statute was repealed. Stats. 1961, c. 560, p. 1672, § 1, CAL. PEN. CODt § 647
(West Supp. 1967). The Kentucky and Massachusetts vagrancy statutes have been
held to be unconstitutional. Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967), and
Alegata v. Commonwealth, .
Mass....., 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
6. See Preface to E. FRwUND, THn POLICE POW.R, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTs at iii (1904), where the author defines police power as "the
power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property."
7. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm., 294 U.S. 613
(1935) ; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911) ; Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
8. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
9. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603,
645 & nn.159 & 161 (1956).
10. Comment, supra note 3, at 128.
11. Such terms as "able-bodied," Ex parte Strittmatter, 58 Tex. Crim. 156, 124
S.W. 906 (1910) ; "visible means of income," Morgan v. Commonwealth, 168 Va. 731,
191 S.E. 791 (1937) ; "satisfactory account," Dominquez v. City and County of Denver,
147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961); and "satisfactory explanation," People v. Bell,
204 Misc. 71, 125 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Nassau County Ct.), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d
821 (1953), have all been held sufficiently specific (1) to guide persons planning
future conduct and (2) to guide the court in adjudicating the rights and duties of
the litigants. But see In re Newbern, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116 (1960), where
the words "common drunk" were held to be unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.
12. In Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953), the Supreme Court refused,
on procedural grounds, to render an opinion where the vagueness argument was
specifically raised with respect to the California vagrancy statute. However, Justice
Black, with whom Justice Douglas concurred, dissented and went on to consider the
merits. Justice Black, relying on Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939),
concluded:
It would seem a matter of supererogation to argue that the provision of this
vagrancy statute on its face and as enforced against petitioner is too vague to
meet the safeguarding standards of due process of law in this country.
344 U.S. at 366.
Recently, the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky adopted
the void for vagueness approach to invalidate that state's vagrancy statute. Baker v.
Bindner,
274 F. Supp.
658 (W.D.
1967).
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In the instant case, the New York Court of Appeals employed a
significant new approach in reviewing the constitutionality of the New
York vagrancy statute. Rather than utilizing the procedural due process
approach of "void for vagueness," the court enunciated a new test of
fourteenth amendment substantive due process for reviewing criminal
legislation - a test of "subject matter competency"' 18 - and decided that
the New York vagrancy statute was constitutionally defective under this
new test. To buttress its decision under this new standard, the New York
court felt compelled to discuss the traditional test of substantive due
process used by courts in reviewing legislation enacted pursuant to the
police power - a test of the reasonable relationship of the statute as a
means to effect a legitimate police power end. It seems apparent, however, that the real basis of the court's decision was the "subject matter
competency" test 14 although the technical holding of the court was
couched in terms of the traditional reasonable relationship test.
Under the traditional test of substantive due process there initially
must be a legitimate police power end. It is hardly questionable that crime
prevention is a legitimate concern of the public, and as such, an equally
legitimate end of the police power. But not only must the end be legitimate, the challenged statute, as a means, must be reasonably necessary to
accomplish that legitimate end.'" With vagrancy legislation this criteria
can be met only if there is some reasonable or rational correlation between
vagrancy and the perpetration of other crimes.' 6 Without alluding to empirical proof, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the existence
17
of this requisite nexus of reasonableness or rationality.
Historically, it has always been presumed that this nexus does exist.',
The feeling that vagrants were potential criminals found early acceptance
13. This test postulates that, regardless of the reasonable relationship of the
statute as a means to achieve a legitimate police power objective, there are certain
types of conduct which are beyond the prerogative of the legislature to make criminal,
and any attempt to proscribe these types of conduct constitutes an overreaching of
the police power - a violation of substantive due process. See Packer, Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. Rv. 1071 (1964).
14. This conclusion is supported by the following language from the court's
opinion:
[W]e feel the statute is defective on the ground that ... however valid or invalid
may be the proposition that the able-bodied unemployed poor are a likely source
of crime . . .it is obvious to all that the vagrancy laws have been abandoned by
our governmental authorities as a means of "persuading" unemployed poor persons
to seek work ...
Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 229 N.E.2d 426, 429-30, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 744
(1967) (emphasis added).
15. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962); accord,
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
16. See People v. Bunis, 9 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507, 172 N.E.2d 273,
274 (1961).
17. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 312-13, 229 N.E.2d 426, 428, 282 N.Y.S.2d
739, 742 (1967).
18. The preamble to the "Slavery Act" recognized this nexus: "[I]dleness and
vagabondry is the mother and root of all thefts, robberies, and all other evil acts, and
other mischiefs.
3 Edw. 6, c.3 (1547), quoted in Comment, supra note 3, at
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
105-06 n.36.
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and incorporation into American legal thought 19 and case decisions.2 0
Although the existence of this nexus in contemporary society is questionable, 2 ' adequate studies have not been made in an effort to prove or
disprove its existence. 22 Those limited studies which have been made tend
to show that there is little correlation between vagrancy and other types
of criminality. 23 One commentator, in examining the elementary psychological makeup of the typical vagrant, has concluded:
Nor does it necessarily follow that one who is idle and apparently
without means of support will turn to criminality. When completely
down and out, he may be able to go on relief or obtain help from
friends or relatives. Many casual workers obtain jobs between periods
of unemployment - which last as long as any funds remain - after
which they may ship out to sea, go back to migratory agricultural
labor or seasonal industrial work or even get a job right in the skid
24
row.

Thus, it would seem that the New York court was justified in labeling
the existence of a nexus between vagrancy statutes and crime prevention
as "tenuous."

Nevertheless, under the traditional test of substantive due process,
"it is enough if it be seen that in any degree, or under any reasonably
conceivable circumstances, there is an actual relation between the means
and the end."'25 In light of this traditional criterion for determining
whether a legislative act violates substantive due process, it would appear
that the Fenster court failed to give the statute under consideration the
requisite deference which attends legislative promulgations. The New
York legislature has determined that a nexus does exist between vagrancy
and crime. While the existing evidence shows only a tenuous relationship, 26 the court should abstain from overruling the statute unless it can

be shown that such a nexus is nonexistent. Under the traditional standard
of review it is not the position of a court to judge the wisdom of a legislative finding, 27 or even to second-guess the legislature where, as with
19. 1 C. TIEDMAN, STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 49,
at 147 (1900).
20. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
21. Foote, supra note 9, at 627; Lacey, supra note 4, at 1224. See Comment, supra

note 3, at 104.

22. Foote, supra note 9, at 627.
23. In a study of sixty-one persons serving terms for vagrancy in the Philadelphia
House of Correction, only eight had criminal records for violations other than vagrancy
or habitual drunkenness, and of those eight, several were of a minor nature. Id. & n.80.
Olaf Kinberg conducted a medico-sociological study of vagrancy in Sweden
and found that vagrants were characterized by an absence of criminality in the usual
sense. Kinburg, On So-Called Vagrancy, 24 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 409, 411 (1933).
24. Foote, supra note 9, at 626-27.
25. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 (1932).
26. The Fenster court admitted that there is at least a tenuous relationship
between vagrancy and crime. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426,
428, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1967).
27. See, e.g., Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U.S. 159, 174 (1909)
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28
vagrancy, the validity of the legislative determination is a debatable one.
Thus, applying the traditional standard, it would appear that vagrancy
statutes, while approaching the outside limits of the fourteenth amendment, do not violate substantive due process.
At noted above, the Fenster court did not restrict its opinion to an
examination of the statute in light of the traditional standard of substantive due process. Rather, the court examined the constitutionality of the
statute by applying a standard of substantive due process which attacks the
exercise of the police power in making vagrancy criminal on a more fundamental and practical level than by questioning the nexus between vagrancy
legislation and crime prevention. Under this new standard, the means
adopted by the legislature to carry out a legitimate police power end
would be subject to a requirement not presented by the traditional substantive due process standard. Under the traditional test, once the end
has been determined to be a proper subject of the exercise of legislative
prerogative, it would appear that the only criterion for the means is
that it must be reasonably related to this end. 29 However, applying the
new standard, the court's determination of whether or not a criminal
statute violates substantive due process will initially be based on the
subject matter which the legislature has made criminal. Thus, the subject
matter proscribed by the statute might in and of itself be beyond the scope
of legislative authority, notwithstanding its rational relationship to a legitimate end. Only after this threshold requisite of "subject matter competency" is satisfied would the court turn its attention to the traditional
0
standard of the reasonable relationship between the means and the end.a
The Fenster court reasoned that at present vagrancy is viewed as a
social problem, and should no longer be the subject matter of criminal
sanctions. Instead, the problem of vagrancy should fall within the scope
of welfare programs aimed at uplifting the individual rather than punishing him. The court pointed to the War on Poverty as an indication that
our governmental authorities had abandoned vagrancy laws "as a means
''3 l
of 'persuading' unemployed poor persons to seek work.
The concept that there are certain areas which are beyond the purview of legislative competency is not an innovation in American juris-

28. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962) ; State Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 190-91 (1938) ; Standard Oil Co. v.
Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 584 (1929) and cases cited therein.
29. See p. 661 supra; Scott, Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal
Law, 29 ROCKY MT. L.Rv.275, 280 (1957).
30. One commentator feels that there is support on the Supreme Court for this
"subject matter competency" standard of substantive due process, not only as it relates
to what conduct can be made criminal, but also as it relates to what punishment can
be prescribed for various criminal acts. See Packer, supra note 13, at 1071-72.
31. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 229 N.E.2d 426, 430, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
744 (1967).
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prudence. Both state3 2 and federal 33 courts, drawing largely from Locke's
Social Compact and the philosophy of Natural Law, early espoused this
concept. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century these expressions
were largely couched in terms of implied or extra-constitutional limitations
on legislative enactments. 34 However, the adoption by the Supreme Court
of a broad interpretation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause 5
provided a basis for elevating these previously extra-constitutional limitations to constitutional ones. It would appear that the Fenster court, by
determining that the New York vagrancy statute was defective in that it
failed the "subject matter competency" test was re-emphasizing the vitality
of this broad interpretation.
The Fenster court does not stand alone in employing this expanded
application of substantive due process with respect to vagrancy legisla6
tion. In Alegata v. Massachusetts,"
and four companion cases, the constitutionality of the Massachusetts vagrancy statute3" was challenged on two
grounds: (1) that it was not a valid exercise of the police power in that
it did not state a crime for which punishment could be imposed, and (2)
that it was void for vagueness.38 After making some general observations
on the history and purposes of the statutes under consideration, as well
as their use or rather abuse as a police tool, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts concluded that the part of the Massachusetts vagrancy
statute which made it a crime to live in idleness and without visible
means of support, was void on its face "as repugnant to the due process
32. E.g., Turpin v. Locket, 6 Call. 113, 125 (Va. 1804); Elliott's Executors v.
Lyell, 3 Call. 268, 286 (Va. 1802).
33. Justice Chase, writing for the majority in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386, 387-88 (1798), stated:

I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is absolute
and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained by
the constitution. . . . An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law), contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a
rightful exercise of legislative authority.
34. See Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the
Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legislatures, 3 T4XAS L.
Rev. 1 (1925) ; 2 TExAs L. Riv. 257, 286 (1924).
35. During the early years of litigation involving the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, the Supreme Court consistently rejected the view that it was meant
to change the relationship between the states and the federal government regarding
the protection of a citizen's rights and property. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) ;
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). The Court subsequently
reversed its position and adopted the view that the due process clause imposed on the
federal courts the duty to protect the citizen from all governmental acts which were
arbitrary in their nature and violative of the fundamental principles of a free government. The due process clause was then used to protect the rights of citizens which
the court felt were vested in the individual. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) ;
Stone v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886). For the judicial development of the fourteenth amendment by the Supreme Court see Haines, Judicial Review
of Legislation in the United States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights and of Implied
Limitations on Legislatures, 3 T~xAs L. Rgv. 1 (1925).
36. _
Mass -........231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
37. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 66 (1956), provides in part:
Idle persons who, not having visible means of support, live without lawful
employment ... shall be deemed vagrants, and may be punished by imprisonment
for not more than six months in the house of correction.
38. Brief for petitioner at 14, 17, Alegata v. Commonwealth,
Mass.
Published
by Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
231 N.E.2d
201 (1967).

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 8

[VOL. 13

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . in that [it] seek[s] to make

criminal conduct which cannot fairly be classed as such and [is] an
invalid exercise of the police power."3 9 Thus, the Massachusetts court
has also determined that vagrancy is not a proper subject of criminal
legislation, and its holding is a much bolder and forthright statement
of this new standard of substantive due process than was the pronouncement of the Fenster court. 40 Having decided that the Massachusetts
vagrancy statute did not meet the threshold substantive due process consideration of "subject matter competency," the Massachusetts court, unlike the Fenster court, did not feel compelled to bolster its decision by
discussing the rationality of vagrancy legislation as a means to effectuate
crime prevention.
This new development of substantive due process has not yet, at
least overtly, received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. The Court,
in the words of Mr. Justice White, would appear to have an "allergy to
substantive due process."' 4 1 But, in spite of this aversion, the Court has,
at least on one occasion, reached virtually the same conclusion by invoking
the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
In Robinson v. California42 the Court held a California statute43 which
made it a crime to be, or have the status of, a dope addict unconstitutional in that it inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
44
fourteenth amendment.
If the Court in Robinson was applying the eighth amendment, it has
undoubtedly added a new standard for cruel and unusual punishment that a punishment may be cruel because of the conduct for which it is
imposed - to supplement the traditional standard - whether the mode4 5
39. Alegata v. Commonwealth, -_ Mass. - , 231 N.E.2d 201, 207 (1967)
(emphasis added). The court also held that the Massachusetts vagrancy statute was
void for vagueness. Id.
40. The Massachusetts court specifically held that the Massachusetts vagrancy

statute was in violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, while the
Fenster court merely stated ambiguously that the New York vagrancy statute was
"defective." However, a reasonable reading of "defective" would be: defective under
the fourteenth amendment due process standard of "subject matter competency."
41.

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962)

(dissenting opinion).

42. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
43. CAL. HEALTH AND SAVFTY COD4 §

11721 (West 1955).

44. Most commentators on the Robinson case express the opinion that the Court
was applying the eighth amendment to the states through the fourteenth. See, e.g.,
48 A.B.A.J. 955 (1962); 29 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 139 (1962); 76 HARV. L. Rtv. 143
(1962) ; 111 U. PA. L. Rvv. 123 (1962). It is possible, however, that the Court was
deciding that this cruel and unusual punishment was violative of substantive due
process, a right independently protected by the fourteenth amendment. See 11 VILL.
L. REv. 861, 863 n.23 (1966).
45. The eighth amendment was originally designed to protect individuals from
the barbarous modes of punishment, such as burning and disemboweling, which were
common in the administration of the English criminal law. See Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 847 (1961).
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or proportion of the punishment bears a reasonable relationship to the
severity of the crime. 46 One commentator has stated:
Robinson v. California may have established in the eighth amendment a basis for invalidating legislation that is thought inappropriately
to invoke the criminal sanction, despite an entire lack of precedent
for the idea that a punishment may be deemed cruel not because
of its mode or even its proportion but because the conduct for
47
which it is imposed should not be subjected to criminal sanctions.
It would seem that the Supreme Court has found, in the eighth amendment, an "euphemism" for the more involved concept of substantive due
48
process.
One problem that is inherent in this new test of substantive due
process is that of establishing the criteria to be used to determine the
subject matter that the legislature may proscribe. One commentator has
suggested that the test should be: "[I]s what the legislature has done,
however rationally supportable it may be, too offensive to stomach ?"49
While this is admittedly a nebulous test, some inkling of the factors which
may be determinative can be gleaned from the Fenster opinion. One
factor would be the policy of the government, as evidenced by its affirmative programs, toward the type of conduct (or status) which the legislature has made unlawful. Another factor, which both the Fenster and the
Alegata courts felt important, was the present application of the law
regardless of its theoretical purposes. In police administration it is generally conceded that, in dealing with vagrancy violations, procedural and
substantive safeguards are less stringent than in other areas of criminal
enforcement. 50 The statutes have been used as a means of circumventing
otherwise constitutionally protected rights. When the police are not able
to obtain sufficient evidence to fulfill the "probable cause" requirement for
arrest in connection with another suspected criminal violation, and are
waiting for evidence to develop, they will detain the suspect on a vagrancy
charge. 51 Used in this manner, vagrancy statutes provide a handy "catch46. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1910).
47. Packer, supra note 13, at 1071.
48. Id. The Supreme Court is not the only court which seems willing to expand
the eighth amendment rather than deal in terms of substantive due process. In two
recent circuit court opinions, Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) and
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966), noted in 11 VILL. L.
Riv. 861 (1966), the respective courts held the convictions of two chronic alcoholics
for public intoxication to be cruel and unusual punishment.
49. Packer, supra note 13, at 1076. One can not help but notice the similarity

between this test and the "shocking the conscience test" enunciated in procedural due
process cases such as Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
50. See Foote, supra note 9, at 645-57; Lacey, supra note 4, at 1209-17, where
the author discusses the procedural, evidential, and substantive differences between
status crimes and those defined in terms of actus.
51. People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 47, 91 P. 997, 1000 (1907). See Douglas,
Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Foote, supra note 9,
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all" for the police.5 2 Spokesmen in sympathy with the problems of law enforcement claim that this residuum of admittedly "ill-defined" power is
necessary in order to cope with today's criminal problems ;53 in fact, vagrancy statutes have been referred to as "one of the most effective weapons
in the arsenal of law enforcement. '54 But no matter how effective they
might be, recent Supreme Court decisions leave little doubt that effectiveness in police administration will not be the decisive factor in upholding a statute or procedure if constitutionally protected rights are in
the balance. 55
In the exercise of the police power there is necessarily a conflict
between the state's interest in maintaining the general welfare of its
citizens and the individual's right to his freedom and liberty. Realizing
this conflict, and considering: (1) that society can always punish the person if and when he commits the unlawful act which vagrancy statutes
theoretically will prevent; (2) the, at best, tenuous relationship between
vagrancy and other criminal conduct; and (3) the modern belief that
vagrants should be assisted and restored to a useful position in society
rather than punished, it seems clear that the Fenster court was correct in
its determination that the New York vagrancy legislation could not stand.
Legislatures, especially in the area of criminal reform, are often
frustratingly slow in reflecting the changing mores of society. It would
appear that the Fenster court, by invoking a novel standard of substantive
due process in reviewing criminal legislation, has decided not to await
legislative reform. By taking the initiative, the Fenster court may provide
the impetus for a re-evaluation and elimination of anachronistic vagrancy
statutes, 56 and its use of a broadened judicial review of criminal legislation should facilitate efforts to draw the law closer in reality to what is
true only in theory today - "that a man's mere property status . . .
cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen
57
of the United States."
Robert R. Reeder
52. Between 1940 and 1946, arrests made for vagrancy ranged between 5.7%
and 8.8% of the total arrests compiled in the UNIFORM CRIM4 R5PORTS. Foote, supra
note 9, at 613 n.20. Since these reports are based only on fingerprints registered with
the F.B.I., the actual percentage was probably even higher. In 1958, in 1,586 cities
over 2,500 in population, there were 88,351 arrests for vagrancy out of a total of
2,340,004 arrests. U.S. D8P'T oF JusTIcE, UNIFORM CRIMg R PORTs 78 (1958). In
1966, in cities ranging in size from under 10,000 to over 250,000, the average rate of
arrest for vagrancy was 92.7 per 100,000 people. U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICS, UNIFORM
CRIMS REPORTS 111 (1966).

53. See H.R. RyP. No. 1248, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
54. Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINcs L.J. 237, 252 (1958).
55. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
56. In Alegata v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
cited Fenster v. Leary as support for their reasoning. Alegata v. Commonwealth, - .......
Mass .......,231 N.E.2d 201, 207 (1967).
57. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (concurring opinion).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
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EMINENT DOMAIN

-

RIPARIAN RIGHTS -

IMPAIRMENT OF RIGHT

OF ACCESS TO NAVIGABLE WATERCOURSE RESULTING FROM IMPROVEMENTS BY THE STATE

Is

NOT COMPENSABLE.

Colberg, Inc. v. State (Cal. 1967)
Plaintiffs owned shipyards on a navigable deep water channel which
yielded access to the open sea. Farther down the channel, between the
shipyards and the mouth of the channel, defendant proposed to build
twin stationary freeway bridges, forty-five feet above the water at the
lowest point. As most of the plaintiffs' business involved ships which
required a clearance greater than that which would be provided by the
proposed bridges,' they sought declaratory relief to determine whether
damages were due them under the law of eminent domain. The trial court
entered judgment for defendant on the pleadings, but was reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Third District.2 The Supreme Court of California, upon further appeal, vacated the court of appeal's decision and
affirmed the trial court's judgment for defendant, holding that a riparian
owner's right of access to a navigable channel is subject to the state power
to control, regulate, and utilize its navigable waters, and, as there was
no direct encroachment upon the riparian owner's land, any abridgement
or diminution of such right of access resulting from the lawful exercise
of this power by the state is not compensable. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67
Cal. 2d 410, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 36
U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. March 5, 1968).
At common law, the right of access from one's land to the waters
bordering it was considered a property right of the riparian owner.8
However, all riparian rights on navigable waters were subject to what
is generally termed "navigational servitude," the power of the sovereign to
utilize navigable waters for public purposes without compensation for the
taking of such rights. 4 In this country, after it was established that the
power to control navigation was vested in the federal government through
the commerce clause of the Constitution,- it was determined that the
power of navigational servitude could be exercised by the federal government.6 In exercising this power, however, the federal government is not
without limitation. The Supreme Court has established that the power
1. One plaintiff, Colberg, Inc., alleged that 81% of its current business involved
ships standing more than forty-five feet above the water line, while the other plaintiff,
Stephens Marine, Inc., alleged that 35% of its business involved such vessels. Colberg,
Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 410, 415, 432 P.2d 3, 6, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404 (1967), cert.
denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. March 5, 1968).
2. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 55 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct. App. 1967).
3. See 2 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW ov EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.792, at 259 (3d ed.
Sackman 1963).
4. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1893).
5. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 627-28
(1961) ; by
United
States
v. Chicago,
M.,Widger
St. P.School
& Pac.
312 U.S.
592, 595-96
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does not extend to instances where there is an actual taking of the riparian
owner's land, but merely that the owner will not be compensated for the
loss of his riparian rights. 7 Additionally, the power is operative only in
instances where the federal government is acting to improve navigation.8
The states also are recognized to have a power of navigational servitude. While this power is subservient to the federal power, where the
federal government has not acted, the power of the states is plenary. 9 The
states, furthermore, have been granted broad discretion by the Supreme
Court to formulate laws concerning navigable waters, 10 and are not bound
to apply the doctrine of navigational servitude solely to governmental
activity which improves navigation."
Having been left to determine their own water laws, the majority
of the states, among them Pennsylvania,

2

New York,

3

Massachusetts,' 14

15

and Ohio, have adopted the federal rule and grant compensation for
the deprivation of riparian rights except where the state acts to improve
navigation (hereinafter the "navigation-only" doctrine)."6 A minority of
the states, however, have permitted a taking of riparian rights without
compensation whenever the state uses or authorizes the use of navigable
waters for any public purpose (hereinafter the "any-public-use" doctrine) .17 It is this latter doctrine that California adopts in the instant
case when the court states: "Whatever the scope and character of [the]
right to have access to . . . navigable waters, we hold that such right is

burdened with a servitude in favor of the state which comes into operation when the state properly exercises its power to control, regulate, and
7. See Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904); Scranton v. Wheeler,

179 U.S. 141 (1900) ; Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950);
United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945) ; cf. California v. United
States, 151 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
9. The states were held not to be deprived of any authority over their navigable
waters by the commerce clause unless expressly forbidden by Congress to exercise
such authority. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
10. See Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921) ; Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18, 26 (1893).
11. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905), where the state of South
Carolina was not required to compensate a riparian owner when it damaged his right
of access by constructing a dam to protect the public health.
12. Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 284 Pa. 225, 130 A. 491 (1925) ; In re Constr.
of Walnut St. Bridge, 191 Pa. 153, reported sub nora., Gumbes v. Philadelphia, 43
A. 88 (1899).
13. Crance v. State, 205 Misc. 590, 128 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Ct. Cl.), modified, 284
App. Div. 750, 136 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1954), rev'd, 309 N.Y. 680, 128 N.E.2d 324 (1955)
In re New York, 168 N.Y. 134, 61 N.E. 158 (1901).
14. Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d
273 (1961).
15. State ex rel. Squire v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d 709 (1948).
See 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 772-73 (1962).
16. For decisions of other states adopting the "navigation-only" doctrine, see, e.g.,
Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1955); Beidler v. Sanitary Dist., 211 Ill.
628,
71 N.E. 1118 (1904); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 36 U.S.L.W. 2363 (Ky. Dec. 15,
1967) ; Natcher v. Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936) ; Conger v.
Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921) ; State v. Adelmeyer, 221 Wis. 246,
265 N.W. 838 (1936). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R. 403, 405 (1922).
17. See, e.g., Frost v. Washington County R.R., 96 Me. 76, 51 A. 806 (1901);

Nelson v. De Long, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
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utilize such waters.'1 8 In announcing this rule, the court invokes no
qualification that the state must be acting to improve navigation.' 9
However, even in those states adopting the "navigation-only" doctrine, given the facts in the instant case, many would concur with the
instant decision. In a majority of "navigation-only" states, compensation for
the taking of a right of access is limited to those instances where the right
of access is to water immediately adjacent to the riparian land.20 Thus,
several Massachusetts cases have denied damages where a plaintiff having
a business on a river was cut off from his access to the sea by a railroad
bridge farther downstream. 21 A recent Ohio case, State ex rel. The Andersons v. Masheter,22 denied damages to a riparian grainery owner whose
access was blocked by a low bridge downstream from his property. New
York awarded no compensation to the riparian owner in Marine Air
Ways, Inc. v. State,23 a case which presented facts almost identical to
those in Colberg.24 Some states adopting the "navigation-only" doctrine,
however, including Pennsylvania, 25 do not recognize this limitation and
would compensate the riparian owner even when a downstream right of
access is impaired. 2 It would appear, then, that the California supreme
court could have disposed of the instant case by merely limiting the application of the "navigation-only" doctrine to situations involving access to
water appurtenant to the land of the riparian owner rather than by adopting
the "any-public-use" doctrine.
18. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 410, 424-25, 432 P.2d 3, 12-13, 62 Cal. Rptr.
401, 410-11 (1967), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. March 5, 1968) (footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 424, 432 P.2d at 12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 410. The court expressly eliminated
such qualification.
20. See 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 5.792[1], at 264.
21. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Old Colony R.R., 122 Mass. 1 (1877). This distinction
was expressly preserved in Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342
Mass. 251, 258 n.1, 173 N.E.2d 273, 277-78 n.3 (1961).
22. 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
23. 201 Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 280 App.
Div. 1021, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952).
24. Frost v. Washington County R.R., 96 Me. 76, 51 A. 806 (1901), cited supra
note 17 to establish Maine as an "any-public-use" doctrine state, also concerned a
right of access claimed by a riparian owner beyond that to the waters bordering
his property.
25. In re Constr. of Walnut St. Bridge, 191 Pa. 153, reported sub nom., Gumbes
v. Philadelphia, 43 A. 88 (1899). The Pennsylvania view may be in part attributable
to the state constitution, which provides that compensation must be made "for property
taken, injured or destroyed by . . . works, highways or improvements . . ." PA.
CONST. art. 16, § 8. It would appear in most instances, however, that the language
of the various state constitutions is not nearly as determinative as the interpretations
given it by the respective state courts. For example, the constitution of Florida
authorizes compensation for only a "taking" of property, FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 29,
but the supreme court of that state has interpreted a "taking" so broadly that Florida
concurs with the most generous position in compensating where a riparian owner is
deprived of his right of access. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1955). By
comparison, the constitutions of California and Minnesota authorize compensation
for either a "taking" or "damaging" of property. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14; MINN.
CONST. art. 10, § 4. However, the courts of these states have interpreted deprivation
of right of access to be neither a "taking" nor a "damaging" requiring compensation.
See Nelson v. De Long, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942) ; p. 667 supra.
26. See, e.g., Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1955) ; Natcher v. Bowling
Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936).
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Earlier California cases supply no direct precedent for the holding in
the instant case. Most of the cases cited by the majority to support their
decision are concerned with state activity designed to improve navigation."'
Only one prior decision, City of Newport Beach v. Fager,28 possibly can be
said to comport with the doctrine adopted by the Colberg court, but the
fact situation there is not really analogous to that in Colberg.29 The Colberg
court, not being bound by California precedent, could have chosen to adopt
the rationale underlying the Marine Air Ways (New York) case and the
Massachusetts decisions.80 These cases hold that the riparian owner, when
blocked downstream, is affected only in regard to his public right of
navigation, the loss of which, unlike his private right of access, is not
compensable.3' The Marine Air Ways case further holds that even if the
right of navigation were affected by a low bridge, it is lost only in regard
to the extraordinary use that the riparian wants to make of the stream.32
It is clear, therefore, that the California court, despite lack of direct
California precedent, had ample authority from other states for arriving
at the same result on narrower grounds, but instead chose to base its
decision on the broader "any-public-use" doctrine.
Several arguments could be offered to justify the wisdom of the broad
holding in Colberg. If damage suits are permitted to succeed when merely
a right of access is taken, a barrage of damage claims may result, thereby
inhibiting state improvements. It has also been suggested that the concept
of riparian rights is outdated, as navigational access has lost its importance,
8
and that the taking of such rights should no longer be compensable. 3
Counter-arguments include the belief that the entire public should share
the financial burden of improvements for the public welfare, and that the
riparian right of access is equivalent to highway access, the loss of which
84
is generally compensable.
27. E.g., Miramar Co. v. Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170, 143 P.2d 1 (1943);
Henry Dalton & Sons Co. v. Oakland, 168 Cal. 463, 143 P. 721 (1914).
28. 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 102 P.2d 438 (1940).
29. This case permitted the plaintiff, who purchased tidelands dredged by the
city, to quiet title, thus wiping out the right of access of the defendant, whose lands
were riparian before the dredging. Cases concerning tidelands, over which the state
has unusual powers in California, are probably poor examples for analogy to other
fact situations.
30. The rationale in State ex rel. The Andersons v. Masheter, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11,
203 N.E.2d 325 (1964), was probably not available to the California court. There,
the Ohio supreme court chose to base its decision on the ground that the Ohio constitution required a physical taking to justify compensation, and that the mere blocking
of the riparian owner's access did not constitute such. Id. at 14, 203 N.E.2d at 328.
The California constitution requires the state to compensate for damages to, as well
as a taking of, land. CAL. CONST'. art. 1, § 14. But see note 25 supra.
31. See Thayer v. New Bedford R.R., 125 Mass. 253 (1878); Blackwell v. Old
Colony R.R., 122 Mass. 1 (1877) ; Marine Air Ways, Inc. v. State, 201 Misc. 349,
350-51, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 280 App. Div. 1021,
116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952).
32. Marine Air Ways, Inc. v. State, 201 Misc. 349, 352-54, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964,
968-70 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 280 App. Div. 1021, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1952).
33. See Baldwin, The Impact of the Commerce Clause on the Riparian Rights
Doctrine, 16 U. FLA. L. Rev. 370, 421-22 (1963).
34. See 2 P. NIcHoLs, supra note 3, § 6.4442, at 571-72. The California supreme
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It is obvious that a balance must be struck between these conflicting
arguments. Regarding the validity of recognizing a riparian owner's right
of access, it appears that compensation whenever any slight deprivation of
the right of access results is unnecessary and impractical.3 5 However, in
some cases - and, it would appear, in the instant case - where the damage
is so complete, so direct, and so specific, some compensation - perhaps
only some displacement of business damages to the plaintiffs in the instant
case - is seemingly in order.36 In such instances, where the duty of the
entire public to bear the cost of public improvements is balanced against
the desire to avoid a somewhat greater drain on the state coffers, the
former would appear to outweigh the latter. Finally, the limitation of the
"navigation-only" doctrine to cases where the right of access taken is to
adjacent waters, although it would deny compensation in the instant case,
appears to be an acceptable cutting-off point for granting compensation.
The "any-public-use" doctrine adopted by the California supreme court
appears much more likely to precipitate instances where private rights
will be unjustly sacrificed for public purposes.
In this regard, the plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari alleging that
the California supreme court's decision deprived them of property without just compensation in violation of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause of the United States Constitution.37 It is not surprising,
however, that the petition was denied 38 in light of contemporary
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution. The tendency of these decisions has been increasingly
to deny compensation whenever federal navigational servitude could be

of his right of highway access in the course of state improvements. See, e.g., Bacich
v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) ; Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d
713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942). It is interesting to note, however, that Chief Justice
Traynor, a staunch guardian of the injured party's right to recovery in the personal
injury context, has consistently been the court's strongest advocate for minimizing
compensatory damages to private property owners when the state is taking the property
for acts to promote the public welfare. In addition to joining the Colberg majority,
67 Cal. 2d at 428, 432 P.2d at 15, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 413, he wrote the majority opinion
in the closely decided Miramar case, 23 Cal. 2d at 171-77, 143 P.2d at 1-4, noted with
disapproval in 32 CAL. L. Rgv. 91 (1944) (no compensation, where city's breakwater,
2V2 miles above riparian hotel owner's property, caused latter's sandy beach to be
washed away), and dissented in both the Bacich, 23 Cal. 2d at 366-80, 144 P.2d at 83239, and Rose, 19 Cal. 2d at 747, 123 P.2d at 525, cases.
35. The decision in Natcher v. Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255
(1936), is an example of a rather extreme recognition of private rights. There, the
plaintiffs, lower riparian owners who had a small gravel business, were granted
damages when deprived of accumulations of gravel by an upstream dam constructed
by the state.
36. The decisions of the Florida supreme court appear particularly fair, in that
they consider the extent of the loss to the riparian owner. Compare Webb v. Giddens,
82 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1955) (compensation granted where riparian owner could no
longer 1rofitably continue his boat rental business), with Moore v. State Rd. Dep't,
171 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1965) (compensation denied where riparian owner lost best and
highest prospective use of land), and Carmazi v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 108 So.
2d 318 (Fla. 1959) (compensation denied where riparian owner was deprived of
pleasure boating).
37. 36 U.S.L.W. 3318 (Supreme Court Proceedings, Feb. 13, 1968) (No. 960).
38. 36 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. March 5, 1968).
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stretched to so justify.3 9 One commentator, in tracing this trend, has even
suggested that several members of the Court would favor adoption of the
"any-public-use" doctrine. 40 To ignore this trend, the Court would have
had to impose a more demanding standard on the states through the fifth
and fourteenth amendments than those established for the federal government through the fifth amendment alone. Apparently the Court was not
prepared to establish such a diverse standard at this time.
It appears, then, that the result in the instant case would have been
reached in most other states, but on the different ground that the plaintiff
riparian owners were seeking compensation for right of access beyond that
merely to the channel fronting their property. The California supreme
court, however, has eliminated compensation for any right of access whenever the state destroys such access in the course of developing a public
work. It is submitted that the court, even should the instant decision be
considered appropriate, has erred in broadening the basis for the state's
ability to destroy property rights without compensation. As the number
and scope of state projects expand, property rights are more likely than
ever to be appropriated in the course of state improvements. To take such
rights without compensation may be to establish a precedent inconsistent
with the traditional sanctity of property rights and the increasing respect
for individual rights in other areas of the law.
David A. Scholl

INHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION NONRESIDENT ALIEN INHERITANCE

ENFORCEMENT OF OREGON

STATUTE BARRED BY EXCLUSIVE

FEDERAL POWER OVER THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Zschernig v. Miller (U.S. 1968)
In September of 1962, Pauline Schrader, an American citizen and
Oregon resident, died intestate in Oregon leaving an estate consisting of
real and personal property located in that State. Her sole heirs, residents
of the Soviet Zone of Germany (East Germany), filed a petition to obtain
distribution after the State Land Board of Oregon had petitioned the
Oregon probate court for the escheat of the net proceeds of the entire
estate under section 111.070 of the Oregon Revised Statutes., The probate
39. See United States v. Rands, 88 S. Ct. 265 (1967); United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956). In both of these cases, the compensation given
to riparian owners for the taking of their land was not permitted to include desirability of the locus of their property for purposes relating to navigation.
40. Comment, Constitutional Law Eminent Domain Condemnation of
Riparian Lands Under the Commerce Power, 55 MICH. L. REv. 272, 284-86 (1956).
1. ORE. RsNv. STAT. § 111.070 (1965) provides:
(1) The right of an alien not residing within the United States or its territories to take either real or personal property or the proceeds thereof in
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
this state by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms
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court, in ordering escheat, decided that there were no treaties applicable,
that section 111.070 was constitutional, and that the heirs had failed to
establish the reciprocity required by the statute. The Supreme Court of
Oregon modified the escheat order, holding that the heirs could take the
Oregon realty by reason of Article IV of the 1923 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany, 2 but that the construction
of the same treaty by the United States Supreme Court in Clark v. Allen3
precluded the heirs from taking the personalty. 4 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court, in reversing, refused to re-examine Clark v. Allen,
holding that section 111.070 of the Oregon Revised Statutes as construed
and applied by the Oregon courts was "an intrusion by the State into the
field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President
and the Congress." Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
It is conceded in this country that each state has the right to enact
laws regulating property within its jurisdiction which descends or is distributed by operation of testamentary instrument or intestate succession. 5
This state power is subject, however, to supersession by treaties and federal
statutes.6 By constitutional provision or statute all of the states have modiand conditions as inhabitants and citizens of the United States, is dependent in each case:
(a) Upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of
the United States to take real and personal property and the proceeds
thereof upon the -same terms and conditions as inhabitants and citizens
of the country of which such alien is an inhabitant or citizen;
(b) Upon the rights of citizens of the United States to receive by payment
to them within the United States or its territories money originating
from the estates of persons dying within such foreign country; and

(c) Upon proof that such foreign heirs, distributees, devisees or legatees
may receive the benefit, use or control of money or property from
estates of persons dying in this state without confiscation, in whole
or in part, by the governments of such foreign countries.
(2) The burden is upon such nonresident alien to establish the fact of existence
of the reciprocal rights set forth in subsection (1) of this section.
(3) If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no heir, devisee or
legatee other than such alien is found eligible to take such property, the
property shall be disposed of as escheated property.
2. Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725 (effective Oct. 14, 1925).
3. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
4. Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Or. 567, 412 P.2d 781, petition for rehearing denied,
343 Or. 592, 415 P.2d 15 (1966).
5. E.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) ; Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S.
556 (1942); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901) ; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S.
315 (1876); Frederickson v. Louisiana, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 445 (1860) ; Dawson v.
Godfrey, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 320 (1808). See also Boyd, The Invalidity of State
Statutes Governing the Share of Nonresident Aliens in Decedents' Estates, 51 Gro.
L.J. 470, 480 (1963) ; Boyd, Treaties Governing the Succession to Real Property by
Aliens, 51 MIcH. L. Rsv. 1001 (1953) ; Kelly, Effect of Probate Code Upon the Claims
of Alien Nonresidents to Share in CaliforniaEstates, 1 HASTINGs L.J. 128, 132 (1950) ;
Comment, The Statutory Regulation of Inheritance by Nonresident Aliens, 13 VILL.
L. Rrv. 148 (1967).
6. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI. See, United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961);
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) ; Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d
433, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953). See generally, A. EtRUNZW5IG, A TREATISS
ON T M CONFLICT O1 LAWs 668 (1962) ; Boyd, Treaties Governing the Succession to
Real Property by Aliens, 51 MICH. L. Riv. 1001, 1006-07 (1953) ; Comment, State
Reciprocity Statutes and the Inheritance Rights of Nonresident Aliens, 1963 DuXX
L.J. 315,by325
& n.41.
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fled the common law disability of aliens to inherit.7 Nevertheless, many of
the states provide that nonresident aliens may take real or personal property
only if certain conditions precedent are satisfied. These conditions are
incorporated into statutes of two general types - "benefit" and "reciprocity."' Reciprocity statutes provide that the nonresident alien heir may take
if he can show that his country grants reciprocal inheritance rights to
American citizens, that is, that his country grants the same inheritance
rights to American citizens as it grants to its own citizens.9 Benefit
statutes generally require that the heir show that he will receive the complete use and control of the funds in order to qualify for distribution.' 0
The Oregon statute under consideration is ,unique in that it is a combination
benefit - reciprocity enactment."
Both types of statutes purport to accomplish several purposes: (1). to
assure reciprocal inheritance rights to American citizens, acting at the
same time as an inducement to foreign nations to grant Americans inheritance rights equal -to those enjoyed by their own citizens; (2) to
assure the legatee receipt of his inheritance; (3) to prevent the property
or funds from falling into the, hands of governments hostile to the United
States; and (4) (perhaps the modern outgrowth of (3)) to discriminate in
distributions on the basis of local conceptions of race, economics, or
12
politics.
7. See Boyd, The- Invalidity of State Statutes Governing the Share of Nonresident Aliens in Decedents' Estates, 51 Go. L.J. 470, 471 (1963).
8. See generally Note, State Statutes Affecting the Inheritance and Distribution
of Estates to Foreign Heirs, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 141. Reciprocity statutes are alone
examined in Comment, State Reciprocity Statutes and the Inheritance Rights of
Nonresident Aliens, 1963 DUKE L.J. 315.
9. See Note, supra note 8, at 141. There are minority variations on this basic
definition. The predecessor of the Oregon statute under consideration in the instant
case, as interpreted, required that as to personal property the foreign country must
grant to United States citizens the same rights that Oregon granted to its citizens.
See opinion of Justice Brand in State Land Bd. v. Brownell, 199 Or. 448, 263 P.2d
769 (1953). California has ruled that its reciprocity statute, which is the same as
section 111.070(1) (a) of the present Oregon statute (note I supra), "necessarily
imports a requirement that the inheritance rights in the foreign country meet some
minimal standard of economic substantiality .. " In re Estate of Larkin, 65 Cal. 2d
60, 65, 416 P.2d 473, 476, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444 (1966) (dictum). See Note, supra
note 8, at 142-43.
10. See Note, supra note 8, at 141.
11. O". Rzv. STAT'. § 111.070(1) (a) (note 1 supra) is the standard formulation
of a reciprocity requirement, and § 111.070(1) (c) (note I supra) is in essence a
benefit requirement. See Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession Under
the "Iron Curtain Rule," 52 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 221, 231 (1957). The Oregon statute has
been characterized as the "most stringent in the nation." Comment, The Statutory
Regulation of Inheritance by Nonresident Aliens, 13 VILL. L. Rzv. 148, 154 n.32
(1967). Cf. Brief for Appellant at 48, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
12. See Boyd, supra note 7, at 485-87; Comment, State Reciprocity Statutes and
the Inheritance Rights of Nonresident Aliens, 1963 DUKE L.J. 315, 317-20; Note,
State Statutes Affecting the Inheritance and Distribution of Estates to Foreign Heirs,
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 141, 141, 148, 150-51.
Most writers seem to doubt .the effectiveness of such statutes in carrying out
these purposes. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 7, at 486-88; Chaitkin, The Rights of
Residents of Russia and its Satellites to Share in Estates of American Decedents,
25 S. CAL. L. Riv. 297, 316-17 (1952); Comment, State Reciprocity Statutes and
the Inheritance Rights of Nonresident Aliens, 1963 DuKE L.J. 315, 317-20; Note, 45
OR. L. Rzv. 221, 223-24 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
38

Editors: Recent Developments

SPRING 1968]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

in the landmark case of Clark v. Allen, I5 state nonresident alien
inheritance statutes received their initial constitutional test. In that case,
the Supreme Court decided that, on its face, the California reciprocity
statute was a valid exercise of state legislative power. The Clark Court
specifically rejected the argument that the California reciprocity statute
was, on its face, an unconstitutional incursion on the federal foreign affairs
power.' 4 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, characterized this
incursion argument as "farfetched.' 1 5 The Clark Court was also faced
with the problem of construing the 1923 Treaty with Germany to ascertain
whether any of its provisions superseded the provisions of the California
statute. The Court construed the treaty so as not to include personalty
located in this country which an American citizen leaves to German
nationals. 6
The Court in the instant case, by refusing to re-examine Clark v.
Allen, 17 gave continued vitality to state nonresident alien inheritance statutes.' 8 The majority was not visibly concerned with the language of the
13. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
14. Id. at 516-17.
15. Id. at 517. As recently as 1962, in Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962),
the Court seemingly reaffirmed its 1947 Clark position on the constitutionality of nonresident alien inheritance statutes on their face. There, the Court held that New
York's withholding of funds, pursuant to its benefit statute, when it appeared that the
distributee would not have their beneficial use, did not present a substantial federal
question.
16. 331 U.S. at 516. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion, objected to
the Court's construction of the treaty since the deceased's nationality had not been
determined. Id. at 518. In retrospect, Mr. Justice Rutledge's objections were well
founded since the Court's assumption that the deceased was an American citizen was
wrong. She was a German national. Meekison, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance
of Personal Property, 44 Am. J. INt'L L. 313, 318 (1950).
17. Since the same treaty that was under consideration in Clark v. Allen was
applicable here, the Court had a very plausible, nonconstitutional ground for disposing
of this action, an approach which would have been more in keeping with traditional
Supreme Court restraint. See Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S.
129, 136-37 (1946) ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936). Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion, wished the Court to re-examine Clark and overrule
the construction of the 1923 Treaty as it related to the taking of personalty. The
Justice Department took the same position in an amicus curiae brief. Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. at 434. The case of Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961), would
have provided ample precedent for this approach. There, the Supreme Court was
faced with an 1881 Treaty with Yugoslavia that contained language identical to the
1923 German Treaty with respect to testamentary or intestate distribution of personalty.
The Court reversed the Oregon supreme court, which had relied on Clark in ruling
that the Treaty did not allow the personalty to pass. Mr. Justice Black, writing for
the majority (in which Mr. Justice Douglas joined), held that the treaty allowed
personalty within the United States to be left to nonresident aliens in Yugoslavia.
Id. at 196. He distinguished the 1923 German Treaty by observing that it did not
have a most favored nation clause. Additionally, he noted that Clark involved a
previously construed provision and that no "relevant history of the negotiations for,
the interpretation of and the practices under" the clause were brought to the Court's
attention with respect to the German Treaty. Id. at 196. But see Clark v. Allen, 331
U.S. 503, 515-16 (1947).
18. The Court did not act on petitioner's arguments that the Oregon statute
under consideration was violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. Brief for Appellant at 7, 14, 61-62, Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968). Construction of these clauses by the Supreme Court, however,
would seem to indicate that nonresident aliens do not fall within the penumbra of
protection provided by these clauses. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886) by
; Boyd,
supra
note 11,Charles
at 163-65.
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Oregon statute on its face 19 but rather focused on the manner in which
the Oregon probate courts applied the statute. Noting that the Oregon
courts conducted "minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of
foreign law, into the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and into
speculation whether the fact that some received delivery of funds should
"not preclude wonderment as to how many may have been denied 'the
right to receive'," 20 the Court concluded, "That kind of state involvement
in foreign affairs and international developments .

..

is not sanctioned by

Clark v. Allen."121 Indeed, the Court stated that "[hiad that case [Clark
v. Allen] appeared in the posture of the present one, a different result
' 22

would have obtained."

It seems clear that the Zschernig Court felt that state nonresident
alien inheritance statutes are not to be used by state courts as vehicles
to express state ideas on foreign policy or make comparisons of political
systems in the context of probate decisions. The Court was convinced
that a supremacy issue was presented by the Oregon court's application
of the statute under consideration; but a supremacy clause issue was not
presented since there was no conflicting treaty or federal legislation forming
the basis for invalidating Oregon's action under its statute. Throughout
the majority opinion are repeated implications of the need for uniformity
23
in the international relations area.
In Hines v. Davidowitz,2 4 a supremacy clause case which the Zschernig

Court cites twice, the Court considered the preemption of a Pennsylvania
Alien Registration Act by a Federal Act in the same area. The Zschernig
Court considered the significant language in Hines to be that relating to
the balance of power in our system of government. In addition to language
indicative of a concern that international relations may be affected by
".. . real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permitted,
by a government," 25 there is very strong dicta in Hines suggesting a limitation of state power when it comes to fields touching international relations.
In the context of discussing preemption problems under treaties and statutes
the Hines Court noted:
Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole
19. There was support on the Court for even stronger action than this narrow
"as applied" ruling, since Justices Stewart and Brennan felt that all three of the
Oregon statutory requirements (note 1 supra) were void on their face. Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (concurring opinion).
20. Id. at 435.
21. Id. at 436.
22. Id. at 433.
23. Statements such as "[T]he Oregon statute as applied ... has more than 'some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,' and . . . great potential for disruption or embarrassment. . .

."

389 U.S. at 434-35, "As one reads the Oregon decisions,

it seems that foreign policy attitudes . . . are the real desiderata," id. at 437, and
"The Oregon law . . . illustrate[s] the dangers . . . involved if each state .

. .

is

permitted to establish its own foreign policy," id. at 441, are sure signs that uniformity is at the heart of the Court's concern.
24. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
25. Id. at 64.
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nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting
foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.2 6
The Hines Court also noted that international relations is "the one aspect
of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded
imperatively to demand broad national authority. '27 Further, "[a] ny concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of
limits .... -28 As a statement of supremacy between conflicting federal
and state legislation in the international relations area, as was the situation
in Hines, these statements have unquestioned significance; as they apply
to a judicial invalidation of state action in an area of traditional state
domain, measured against no express statement of federal policy, their
significance is less compelling.
At the very least, Zschernig seems to be a reaffirmation of the policies
underlying Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.29 There, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the "Act of State" doctrine 0 and rejected the contention
that an exception should be made when it is judicially decided that foreign
actions violate international law.31 Additionally, Sabbatino held that state

courts are bound to apply the "Act of State" doctrine because it falls in
the federal domain. 32 The Court stated that the "Act of State" doctrine
was not compelled by the nature of sovereign authority, nor by international
law, nor by the text of the Constitution, but indicated that it does have
constitutional underpinnings:
It arises out of the basic relationship between branches of government
in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of
dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of
decisions in the area of international relations. 33
The Sabbatino Court then determined that the scope of the doctrine must
be determined by federal law, the necessity for this being the superiority
of the federal interest in a question of this type.3 4 Although the "Act of
State" doctrine itself does not govern Zschernig, the basic view of our
governmental structure enunciated in Sabbatino, as well as in Hines, indi26. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 68.
28. Id.
29. 376 U.S. 398.
30. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), where this doctrine
is explicated.
31. 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
32. Id. at 427.
33. Id. at 423 (1964).
34. See Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino,
64 COLUM. L. Rzv. 805 (1964), where Professor Henkin rhetorically questions the
ramifications of the Sabbatino decision: "The question is, however, whether both power
and supremacy should be implied broadly to make the states subservient to the independent law of federal courts in all areas of federal activity." Id. at 816 n.34. See also
Miller, The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community, 46 VA.
L. Rev. 1539, 1542-49 (1960) ; Note, 45 ORn. L. Rev. 221, 228-31 (1966) ; Comment,
The Statutory Regulation of Inheritance by Nonresident Aliens, 13 VILL. L. REV. 148,
166-69by (1967).
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cates that federal common law concepts are the grounds for the result
3
reached in Zschernig. 5
Support is given to the foregoing analysis by an examination of Mr.
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Ioannou v. New York,3 6 the source
of the basic concepts and much of the terminology used in the instant
opinion. In Ioannou, Justice Douglas dissented from a dismissal for want
of a substantial federal question because he felt that the subject matter of
international property distribution was a proper subject of international
relations, and that the federal government's complete power over international affairs cannot be subject to state interference. He concluded:
Admittedly, the several States have traditionally regulated the
descent and distribution of estates within their boundaries. This does
not mean, however, that their regulations must be sustained if they
impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy. .

.

. Yet,

even in the absence of a treaty, a State's policy may disturb foreign
relations. .

.

. The present restraints are not as gross an intrusion

in the federal domain as those others would be. Yet they affect international relations in a persistent and subtle way. The practice of
state courts.

. . is

notorious.

The issue is of importance to our foreign relations and I think
this Court should decide whether, under existing federal
policy and
37
practice, the New York statute should be given effect.
There is no doubt that this concern is embodied in the Zschernig decision,
and that the Court has manifested a willingness to evaluate nonresident
alien inheritance statutes against its conception of "existing federal policy
and practice."
The "as applied" holding in the instant decision leads to speculation
as to what types of practices employed38 by state probate courts will be
proscribed. Unquestionably, the Supreme Court was concerned with state
probate court practices that involve an appraisal of a foreign government's
application of its own law or an evaluation of that governmental system
itself.a9 The necessity for such an appraisal arises in a state court when
the alien beneficiary or legatee attempts to satisfy the requirements of a
reciprocity statute, benefit statute, or hybrid statute (either one similar to
Oregon's., or as is sometimes encountered, a reciprocity statute that is
applied in a manner that incorporates benefit type tests) .40 When an ap35. See Comment, The Statutory Regulation of Inheritance by Nonresident Aliens,
13 VILL. L. Rnv. 148, 165-66 (1967).
36. 371 U.S. 30 (1962).
37. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
38. For discussion of the various practices employed by state probate courts to
determine "benefit" or "reciprocity" see Note, State Statutes Affecting the Inheritance
and Distribution of Estate to Foreign Heirs, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 141, 145-47, 151-57;
Comment, The Statutory Regulation of Inheritance by Nonresident Aliens, 13 VILL.
L. Rev. 148, 154-62 (1967).
39. See 389 U.S. at 434; p. 676 supra.
40. See note 9 supra; Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 COLUM. L.
Rgv. 257, 268 (1962) ; Comment, State Reciprocity Statutes and the Inheritance Rights
of Nonresident Aliens, 1963 DuKe L.J. 315, 321,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
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praisal is required by a state probate court, it must ascertain whether benefit to the alien or reciprocity of inheritance rights actually exists.
Benefit statutes appear, at first, to be more severely affected by
Zschernig, since the alien's attempt to prove actual receipt and use of the
inheritance necessarily involves greater examination of the foreign legal
system and credibility of foreign officials. Whenever a state court utilizes a
judicial notice approach to determine that an alien will not receive the
benefit of his inheritance - that is, when the court takes judicial notice of
the inherently dictatorial, anti-capitalistic, or suppressive nature of a foreign
government 4 1- it is engaging in practices proscribed by Zschernig. Another method which state courts often utilize is reliance upon reports from
the State Department. Of these reports, the most commonly used are
Treasury Department directives which state our government's position on
drawing government checks in favor of payees in a foreign nation on the
basis of the assurance of receipt.4 2 A court looking to these directives
for guidance would seem to have the approval. of the Zschernig Court,
since such directives would be an expression of federal policy made by a
branch of the Executive, which, along with Congress, has exclusive control over foreign affairs. A third method used by state probate courts
to'determine whether the alien receives actual benefit is a comparison by
the state court of the foreign government's currency exchange rate, or
other monetary and purchasing power comparisons. 43 The effect of
Zschernig on this type of practice no doubt rests on the approach of the
state court. An objective finding of fact that the foreign country takes
half the value of the inheritance in the process of exchange through a
bank managed by that foreign state would probably be within Zschernig's
ambit of permissible activity. However, an opinion which undertakes a
comparison of purchasing power in regard to arbitrarily selected American
consumer items such as refrigerators or cars might be proscribed.
A determination by a state probate court of the existence of reciprocity
can also involve the court in forbidden conduct.: The Zschernig Court
apparently was not disturbed by state court practices such as the "routine
reading of foreign laws," 44 or the examination of an authenticated copy of
that law, or characterization of the foreign laws by the statement of an
official of that country. But a probe into the actual existence of reciprocity
might involve, in addition to the above mentioned practices, the testimony
of foreign law experts, opinions of eminent jurists of the foreign country,
41. See Berman,. Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 COLUM. L. Rxv. 257,
257-58 (1962); Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession under the
"Iron Curtain Rule," 52 Nw. U.L. Riv. 221, 233-34 (1957).
42. See Comment, State Reciprocity Statutes and the Inheritance Rights of Nonresident Aliens, 1963 DuK. L.J. 315, 324; Note, State Statutes Affecting the Inheritance and Distribution of Estates to Foreign Heirs, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 141, 153-54.
43. See Berman, supra note 41, at 266-68; Comment, The Statutory Regulation
of Inheritance by Nonresident Aliens, 13 VILL. L. Riv. 1.48, 160-61 (1968).
389 U.S. University
at 433. Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
Published44.by Villanova
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the testimony of people who have practiced law there, and evidence of
actual cases of reciprocity. 45 Whether Zschernig disapproves of exact and
careful court examinations of benefit or reciprocity per se, or whether it
disapproves of such examinations only when done with xenophobia is
open to question. The intentionally restrictive nature of this "as applied"
decision, however, leads to the latter conclusion.
Although separation of benefit and reciprocity statutes is convenient
for purposes of discussion, the Court is clear that both types would be
proscribed if improperly applied.

The Court noted that, ".

.

. such

forbidden state activity has infected each of the three provisions of
§ 111.070, as applied by Oregon. '46 Under Zschernig, the application
of the statute is more important than its language. Therefore, if
the desideratum of the state court is discrimination against a disfavored
nation through a probate practice that affords an opportunity for criticism
and unfavorable comparison of the latter's political structure, Zschernig
is applicable whether the statutory provision is of the benefit or reciprocity
type.
It seems clear that the Court in Zschernig has moved beyond a treaty
or federal statutory limitation on the state's power in this area to another
limitation with constitutional underpinnings - the exclusive federal power
over foreign affairs. State courts involved in probate proceedings involving nonresident aliens unfortunately do not have definite guidelines
as to the extent of this limitation. State courts may be able to withhold
distribution or order escheat to almost the same extent as before this
case as long as the proceedings are not marred by inquiries into the
systems of foreign governments or by remarks of the court concerning
political ideologies or foreign affairs. The Court's action here might even
provide the impetus for a federal statute governing inheritance by nonresident aliens.4 7 Finally, the Zschernig decision would seem to give notice
that a state-by-state re-examination of these nonresident alien inheritance
statutes and action under them is due, and that retention of substantial
effective, will depend
state power, insofar as the statutes are internationally
48
on the use the states make of these statutes.
John R. Doubman, Jr.

45. See Kelly, Effect of Probate Code Upon the Claims of Alien Nonresidents to
Share in California Estates, 1 HASINGS L.J. 128, 136-37 (1950).
46. 389 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added).
47. The Court, in fact, suggested that if restraints such as those applied by the
Oregon courts are to be sanctioned, "they must be provided by the Federal Government." 389 U.S. at 441.
48. Movement in this direction has been urged by many writers, though without
specific proposals as to the form it might take. See Berman, Soviet Heirs in American
Courts, 62 COLUM. L. Riv. 257 (1962); Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to
Succession under the "Iron Curtain Rule," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 221 (1957) ; Miller, The
Corporationas a Private Government in the World Community, 46 VA. L. Rav. 1539
(1960) ; Note, State Statutes Affecting the Inheritance and Distribution of Estates to
Foreign Heirs, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 141.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8

44

Editors: Recent Developments
SPRING

1968]

REAL ESTATE

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

-

BROKERS
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VENDOR'S

LIABILITY

FOR BROKER'S

COMMISSION ACCRUES ON DATE PURCHASER CLOSES TITLE FAULTING PURCHASER Is LIABLE TO BROKER FOR COMMISSION.

DE-

Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson (N.J. 1967)
Pursuant to a written brokerage agreement, plaintiff, a real estate
brokerage firm, was retained by defendants, owners of farm property,
to secure a purchaser for their property. Defendant developer also sought
plaintiff's services in finding suitable land for residential development,
and orally agreed with plaintiff to purchase property through its firm if
satisfactory terms with the seller could be arranged. The developer
understood that the vendors would pay the broker's commission. Through
plaintiff's efforts, defendants owners and developer entered into a written
contract of sale for the farm property, one provision of which provided
for payment of plaintiff's commission by the vendors out of the purchase
price. Purchaser's financial inability, however, caused him to default
on this contract, and by mutual agreement the vendors and purchaser
released each other from all obligations thereunder.
Plaintiff then initiated this action for its commission against the
vendors under the brokerage agreement, and against the purchaser for
breach of an implied agreement to complete the transaction with the
vendors. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant vendors, and submitted the issue of the purchaser's liability on
the implied agreement to the jury. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed both judgments of the trial court, holding that the
vendors' liability to pay the plaintiff's commission presented a jury question and that there was insufficient evidence to show an implied agreement between the plaintiff and the defaulting purchaser.1 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey granted certification to re-evaluate the justice and
propriety of continuing the long standing New Jersey rule that a real
estate broker is entitled to his commission from the vendor upon execution of a contract of sale between the purchaser and vendor. The supreme
court rejected this rule and reversed the superior court as to the vendors,
holding that when a broker is engaged by a property owner to locate
a purchaser for him, the broker has a right to his commission when (a)
he produces a ready, willing, and able purchaser, (b) the purchaser
executes an enforceable contract of sale with the owner, and (c) the
purchaser closes title according to the provisions of the contract. The
supreme court also reversed the superior court's judgment for the purchaser, holding that the law implies a promise on the part of the purchaser in favor of the broker that the purchaser will complete the transac1. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 92 N.J. Super. 271, 223 A.2d 199 (App.

Published
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tion with the vendor and thereby entitle the broker to earn his commission.
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
Whether a broker is entitled to his commission from the vendor
when an enforceable contract of sale has been breached because of the
prospective purchaser's financial inability to complete, is judicially controverted.2 The traditional approach is to view the broker's duty as
merely requiring the procurement of a "ready, willing and able purchaser"
so that once the broker brings the vendor and purchaser into negotiations
leading to an enforceable contract of sale he becomes entitled to his
commission from the vendor, regardless of subsequent events causing
noncompletion of the contract of sale.3 The rationale for this approach is

that upon execution of the contract of sale, the vendor accepts the financial
status of the purchaser, and is thereafter estopped from denying that he
assumed the risk of the purchaser's default. 4 Implicit in this approach
is the idea that the vendor can protect himself by stipulating in the
brokerage agreement that the broker's right to his commission is contingent upon the purchaser's completion of the contract of sale.3 Conversely,
a minority of courts hold that the broker impliedly warrants the financial
ability of the purchaser he obtains.6 This implied warranty, in turn,
insulates the vendor from liability for the broker's commission when the
prospective purchaser defaults on the contract of sale.7 Axiomatically,
the vendor who himself fails or refuses to perform under the terms of
the contract of sale is liable to the broker, whether the right to commission accrues upon execution of the contract of sale or upon closing of
title."
The court in the instant case reversed nearly a century of New Jersey
precedent which espoused the traditional rule.9 In effecting this change, the
court redefined a "ready, willing and able purchaser" procured by the
broker to be a person who is able to complete the transaction, and not
merely a person who enters into a contract of sale with the vendor. 10
To buttress this new definition, the court pointed to the reasonable expectations of both the broker and the vendor, that is, that "the owner will
2. See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R. 926 (1931) ; Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1390 (1927);
Annot., 20 A.L.R. 289 (1922).
3. See, e.g., Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42 (1871). See also, RESTAr5MEN'r
(StcoND) ov AGSNCY § 445, comment d at 347 (1958).
4. See, e.g., Flicker v. Ragan, 126 Misc. 185, 212 N.Y.S. 703 (Sup. Ct. 1925)
Mechem, The Real Estate Broker and His Commissions, 6 ILL. L. Riv. 238, 245
n.40 (1911).
5. See, e.g., Clark v. Jelsma, 40 N.J. Super. 58, 122 A.2d 180 (App. Div. 1955).
6. See Mangano v. Rooney, 77 R.I. 324, 74 A.2d 867 (1950), noted in 24 TnMP.
L.Q. 357 (1951); Sheggia v. Gradwell, [1963] All E.R. 114, 117 (Ct. App.) (dissent).
214 A.2d 49 (1965). But see Valois v.
R.I -.......
7. Gartner v. Higgins,
Pelletier, 84 R.I. 176, 122 A.2d 148 (1956) (vendor exercised independent judgment
concerning purchaser's ability to complete, therefore warranty inapplicable).
8. See Eskin v. Acheson Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Blau v. Friedman, 26 N.J. 397, 140 A.2d 193 (1958) ; Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N.Y. 378,
384, 38 Am. R. 441, 446 (1881); Phelps v. Munroe, 166 Wis. 315, 165 N.W. 471 (1917).
19. The leading case was Hinds v. Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
10. 50 N.J. at 548, 552, 236 A.2d at 853, 855.
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sell and the buyer will pay, and the broker will thus earn his commission
out of the proceeds."'" The court continued:
This uncomplicated reality should not be complicated by controversies
over who knew what with respect to the buyer's financial capacity
to close the title. The risk of such inability at that crucial time
must
2
be treated as a normal incident of the brokerage business.1
As a natural conclusion, the court held that completion of the contract
of sale by the purchaser procured by the broker is a condition precedent
to the vendor's liability for the broker's commission.13 In effect, the broker
14
impliedly warrants the financial ability of his purchaser to complete.
Although the Johnson court could have restricted the broker's warranty to the purchaser's financial ability to complete the transaction, it
extended the warranty to his total performance before closing. Thus, if
the purchaser defaults for any reason whatever, the broker will have no
right against the vendor for his commission. 15 Apparently, the theory
underlying this holding is that to require a property owner to pay a commission on a sale aborted without fault on his part would be too burdensome on those few owners who suffer default. Conversely, by placing the
risk on the brokerage business, the burden, in the form of increased
brokerage fees, is spread over the aggregate of property owners who sell
their property through brokers. 16
Having enunciated this new rule and declared it to constitute the
"public policy of our State,"'1 7 the court next considered the extent to
which the broker could, by special contract, impose on the property
owner-vendor liability for his commission as of the date of the contract
of sale. First, the court noted that the brokerage profession legislatively
has been determined to be within the ambit of the "public interest," and
is regulated to prevent injury to the public in the form of fraud, incompetence, and unconscionable practices.' 8 These regulatory statutes were
enacted primarily to crystallize the broker's duties to the vendor as his
agent. They include the duties to act fairly, with fidelity, good faith
and best efforts. 19 The court was also constrained to notice the probable
11. Id. at 552, 236 A.2d at 855.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855.
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Although not expressed in the opinion, the Johnson court may also have been
interested in removing risks from the land development industry, a group presently
plagued by purchasers defaulting because of financial incapacity. See Hearings on
Mortgage Foreclosures and the Necessity for Corrective Legislation or Administrative
Action Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 213-15 (1964); Builders Fear Money Drought, BusiN4ss WSEK,
Oct. 14, 1966, at 99.
17. 50 N.J. at 555, 236 A.2d at 857.
18. Id. at 552-54, 236 A.2d at 856-57.
19. Several states have Statutes of Frauds concerning brokerage agreements as
well as other regulatory measures. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODA §§ 10000-10341
(Westby1964);
MAss.
GAN. Charles
LAWS ch.
112,School
§§ 87PP
to Digital
DDD Repository,
(1965); N.J.
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disparity of bargaining position between the broker, normally a highly
skilled and economically influential businessman, and the vendor, usually
an untrained member of the public. Following the reasoning of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 20 and implicitly analogizing to manufac-

turers' disclaimer of warranty clauses, the court ruled:
[I]n our judgment public policy requires the courts to read into
every brokerage agreement or contract of sale a requirement that
barring default by the seller, commissions shall not be deemed earned
against him unless the contract of sale is performed. By the same
token, whenever the substantial inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage to which we have adverted appears, a provision
to the contrary in an agreement prepared or presented or negotiated
or procured by the broker
shall be deemed inconsistent with public
21
policy and unenforceable.
In comparing the traditional rule and the rule enunciated in Johnson,
the difference seemingly hinges upon what constitutes the vendor's acceptance of the purchaser procured by the broker. Arguably, the vendor's
entering into a contract of sale with the purchaser is a sufficient acceptance,
especially since after that time the broker has no positive duty to his
vendor-principal. In fact, the drafting of the contract of sale itself as
well as arranging for the passing of title is a task characteristically performed by the attorneys for the vendor and the purchaser without the
aid of the broker. 22 Hence the broker's employment could properly be
said to require merely his procurement of a purchaser to negotiate with
the vendor.23 An additional justification for this approach is that the
broker's right to his commission should not depend on events beyond
the broker's control, that is, the completion of the contract of sale by the
purchaser.
The Johnson court, however, focused on the expectations of both
the vendor and broker in light of modern day realities. Certainly the
vendor anticipates, as the broker's work product, that the purchaser will
complete the contract of sale. In this vein, the court indicated that the
reasonable expectation of the vendor should also be the reasonable expectation of a conscientious broker. 24 Such an assumption must necessarily
be premised on the court's view of what the broker's duty must be, since
a broker might justifiably expect his right to a commission from the
§§ 45:15-1 to 45:15-29.5 (1963); N.Y. REAL PROP.
1945) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 431-448 (1959).

LAW

§§ 440-442-K (McKinney

20. 32 N.J. 358, 385-406, 161 A.2d 69, 84-96 (1960) (per Francis, J., author of
the Johnson opinion).
21. 50 N.J. at 555-56, 236 A.2d at 857-58.
22. See Note, The Implication of a Promise to Buy or Sell into a Real Estate
Brokerage Contract: An Analysis of the Ready, Willing and Able Theory, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 380, 382 (1966).
23. Indeed, some courts have held that the execution of a contract of sale between
the vendor and the purchaser is not necessary to entitle the broker to his commission
from the vendor. See, e.g., Beard v. Read, 167 Ark. 98, 267 S.W. 577 (1924).

24. 50 N.J. at 547, 236 A.2d at 852-53.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
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vendor to accrue once a contract of sale with the purchaser is executed
thereby rendering the broker's affirmative performance complete. Thus, in
resolving the problem of whether the vendor or the broker is to bear the
risk of loss resulting from the purchaser's failure to complete the contract
of sale, two considerations are paramount: who is better able to investigate and ascertain the purchaser's probability of completing, including
the credit search, and, of the two innocent parties, who is better able to
bear the actual loss. 25 The Johnson court, in balancing the interests,

decided these questions in favor of the vendor, thereby making the
broker's commission contingent upon the purchaser's completion. Since
the traditional rule was conceived in an earlier time to protect the broker
in a seller's market, 26 and since the rise of the brokerage profession and
the increased volume of real estate transactions 27 have so changed the
context in which the rule operated as to make it inequitable, the result in
Johnson is seemingly proper.
Two alternative approaches employed by other courts to achieve the
same result were also available to the Johnson court. Thus, when the
broker is to be paid from a fund (the purchase price) to come into
existence at a later date, the establishment of this fund can be considered
an implied condition precedent to the broker's right to his commission. 28
A variant of this approach is that the broker's right to his commission
is not conditional, but that the time of its payment is postponed until the
purchase price is paid.2 9 Thus, if the purchase price is not paid by the
purchaser, the time for payment of the broker's commission is postponed
indefinitely. Either approach is, however, actually based on the reasonable
expectations of the parties, since the broker ordinarily would not expect
his commission until the purchase price was paid, few vendors having the
resources to pay the commission out of pocket. 30
As previously noted, the court was also concerned with the vendor's
inability to meaningfully participate in formulating the terms and
conditions of the agreement in the face of the broker's efforts to
draft the brokerage contract to provide for a right to commission at
the time an enforceable contract is signed. 31 In fact, the court noted
that, in the typical situation, the vendor-owner who retains a broker is
presented with a standardized printed form containing the terms and conditions of the brokerage agreement. 32 Because of this widespread use of
standardized forms and the concomitant possibility of contracts by adhesion, the court extended to the brokerage profession the rationale of
25. See p. 683 supra.
26. See 32 COLUM. L. Rev. 1194, 1194-95 n.3 (1932).
27. See The Good Earth, 74 FORTUNr, Nov., 1966, at 241.
28. See Comment, Real Estate Brokers In Arkansas, 17 ARK. L. Rev. 57, 62-64
(1963).
29. Richard v. Falleti, 13 N.J. Super. 534, 81 A.2d 17 (App. Div. 1951).
30. Note, supra note 22, at 384.
31. See pp. 683-84 supra.
32.by50Villanova
N.J. at University
554, 236 A.2d
at Widger
857. School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
Published
Charles
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Henningsen v. Bloom field Motors, Inc.33 regarding unconscionable contracts.
Since Henningsen was decided, however, the Uniform Commercial
Code has been enacted in New Jersey. Although brokerage agreements
are not expressly covered by its provisions,3 4 the Johnson court cited section 2-302 as a possible standard by which to evaluate brokerage agreements. While arguably such a step is without the province of the court,
and the ramifications of such an analogy could be far-reaching, the result
appears sound. Notwithstanding complaints grounded in the loss of
freedom to contract, the broker should not easily be able to contract
away a duty implied by the business relation at the expense of an unsuspecting vendor. If the brokerage agreement stipulates otherwise, the
broker must prove that the vendor was free to negotiate, and not in
fact forced by business necessity to agree to pay a commission upon execution of the contract of sale. Thus, it may be argued that the freedom to
contract at arm's length is assured rather than restricted.
Although the instant decision evinces a progressive approach toward
reviewing brokerage agreements, there are situations where the vendor will
incur liability for the broker's commissions despite a breach of the contract
of sale by the broker-procured purchaser. The Johnson court, in accord with
the weight of authority, recognized that the vendor is not under a duty to
the broker to enforce his rights under the contract of sale against a defaulting purchaser. 85 However, if the vendor voluntarily sues and recovers
damages or a specific performance decree, the court indicated that, notwithstanding the warranty, the vendor is "deemed to have accepted the
benefit of the broker's services, and is liable for the commission. '36 The
criterion by which the vendor's liability is to be measured, however, is
still substantial fulfillment of the conditioning events, that is, the completion of the contract of sale.3 7 Thus, as in the instant case, when the
default is due to the purchaser's financial inability to complete, a release
will be treated as an attempt by the vendor to rescue the status quo before
the sales agreement is executed, rather than as an affirmation of the
broker's inability to produce a qualified buyer.88 Clearly, in no way can
the vendor be said to have accepted the benefit of the broker's services.
Moreover, if the vendor and purchaser mutually release without default,
the broker would have no right under the brokerage agreement, 9 al33. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (Francis, J.).
34. N.J. Rev. STAT. § 12A:2-106 (1962), cf. § 12A:2-105, Comment 1.
35. 50 N.J. at 557, 236 A.2d at 858. See also Amies v. Wesnofske, 255 N.Y. 156,
174 N.E. 436 (1931), noted in 31 COLUm. L. Riv. 701 (1931) ; 32 COLUM. L. &~v. 1194
(1932) ; Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 437, 493 (1960).
36. 50 N.J. at 558, 236 A.2d at 859. See also Diebler v. Graham, 62 A.2d 553,
556 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948).
37. See 32 COLUM. L. Rv. 1194, 1197 (1932).
38. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 558, 236 A.2d 843, 859 (1967).
See also Weiner v. Infeld, 116 Misc. 323, 190 N.Y.S. 82 (App. T. 1921), noted in
22 COLUM. L. Rzv. 272 (1922).
39. See Cochran v. Ellsworth, 126 Cal. App. 2d 429, 440-41, 272 P.2d 904, 911
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/8
(1954) ; Leventritt v. Cowell, 21 Cal. App. 597, 132 P. 627 (1913). Contra, Abegglen
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though the question could be raised whether the vendor, by accepting
a release, acted in bad faith toward his agent, thus himself being at
40
fault.
Faced with the possibility that a broker who had expended time and
effort would be left remediless 41 when the purchaser breached the contract of sale, the Johnson court noted that an agency relationship also
existed between the broker and the purchaser. 42 The court recognized
the common expectation of both the broker and his purchaser-principal
when it stated: "'. . . both know the broker expects to earn a commission
from the seller if he succeeds.' -43 To protect this expectation, the court
continued:
[T]he law will imply a promise on the part of the buyer to complete
the transaction with the owner. If he fails or refuses to do so without valid reason, and thus prevents the broker from earning the
commission from the owner, 44he becomes liable to the broker for
breach of the implied promise.
The rationale for such an implied promise to complete can be based
on two theories. The first, and the one adopted by the Johnson court, is
that an implied promise will arise if a reasonable person as a promisee
would anticipate that the promisor would perform the promise. 45 The
second is that the agency relationship itself may give rise to an implied contract in which the principal guarantees his good faith and cooperation to
46
his agent.
Other courts have arrived at the result reached in Johnson by
utilizing the conceptual approach of a third party beneficiary contract
47
in which the broker is the creditor beneficiary of the contract of sale.
For example, in Chipley v. Morrell,48 where the contract of sale expressly
provided for the payment of the broker's commission by the vendor, and
v. Burnham, 91 F. Supp. 61, 64-65 (D. Idaho 1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir.
1951) ; Tarbell v. Bomes, 48 R.I. 86, 135 A. 604 (1927).
40. See cases cited note 8 supra. See also Note, The Real Estate Broker's Right
to a Commission Upon the Procurement of a PurchaserReady, Willing, and Able to
Purchase, 41 CHI.-KENT L. Rzv. 67, 84 (1964).
41. A broker may have a remedy in tort against a purchaser for intentional interference with contractual relations or intentional interference with prospective businessadvantage. See Fitt v. Schneidewind Realty Corp., 81 N.J. Super. 497, 196 A.2d 26
(L. Div. 1963). See also W. PROSSR, THz LAW or ToRTs §§ 123-24 (3d ed. 1964).
42. 50 N.J. at 558-59, 236 A.2d at 859.
43. Id., quoting Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455, 462, 197 A.2d 359, 363-64 (1964).
44. Id. at 559, 236 A.2d at 859. See also Tanner Associates, Inc. v. Ciraldo, 33
N.J. 51, 161 A.2d 725 (1960) ; Duross Co. v. Evans, 22 App. Div. 2d 573, 257 N.Y.S.2d
674 (1965). Contra, Giovannoni v. Waple & James, Inc., 105 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir.
1939) ; Harling v. Tift, 43 Ga. 94, 157 S.E. 914 (Ga. App. 1931), noted in 9 N.Y.U.L.Q.
RZv. 108 (1931). See generally Note, supra note 22.
45. See cases cited note 44 supra. See also Note, supra note 22, at 382 (1966).
46. See W. SSAVEY, LAW oF AGFNCY § 165 (1964). Under either theory, the
measure of damages would be the amount of the broker's lost commissions which
the vendor had agreed to pay or in the absence of any agreed upon figure, quantum
meruit. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 559, 236 A.2d 843, 859 (1967).

47. See generally A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 787, 816-19, 824 (1951).
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School noted
of Lawin
Digital
Repository,
19681054 (1948).
48.Villanova
228 N.C.
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the purchaser wrongfully defaulted, the court allowed the broker to
recover from the purchaser:
While plaintiffs are not parties to the contract between defendants, they are beneficiaries under it to the extent of their commissions. And if the contract was not carried out by reason of
[the] wrongful act of [purchaser], plaintiffs would have a cause of
action against [purchaser] for recovery of damages. 49
The recent case of Massengale v. Transitron Electronic Corp.50 also held
the defaulting purchaser liable to the broker under the same theory, rejecting arguments based upon lack of consideration and privity. 51
In comparing the two approaches, it would seem that the approach
taken by the Johnson court is more onerous on the defaulting purchaser.
The theory of recovery based on an implied promise to complete does
not require an express provision in the contract of sale specifying that
the purchaser will pay the broker's commission; such a clause is unnecessary since the purchaser's liability arises from the broker's expectation
that the purchaser will complete the contract of sale. 52 Prima facie, the
implied promise should arise when an agency relationship is found between
the purchaser and broker. Because the agency itself need not be express,
but may be implied, 58 it is difficult to conceive of many situations where
the promise will not be implied. On the other hand, a third party beneficiary theory demands an express statement in the contract of sale that
there is a debt owing to the broker, which either the vendor or purchaser
will pay.

54

It is submitted that the instant decision effects a desirable change in
the law. A party employed to perform a task should not be heard to
complain if his compensation is conditioned upon the full satisfaction of
his duty. Hopefully, the decision will provide the impetus for future
judicial or legislative reform of a rule once salutary, but now "deficient
as an instrument of justice." 55
Michael P. Marnik
49. 228 N.C. at 241, 45 S.E.2d at 130.
50. 385 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1967). See also Blanken v. Bechtel Properties, Inc.,
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